Fadi Khraibe, Arkady Dubnov, Kirill Rogov
Yevgenia Albats*: The war between the US and Israel against Iran has affected most countries in the Middle East. In Europe, prices for liquefied gas have risen sharply because Iran's strike hit Qatar. Of course, oil prices are rising. And the forecasts for the future, frankly, range from bad to very bad.
The Russian Federation has almost openly entered the war on Iran's side. It began providing Iran with intelligence on American targets in the Gulf countries. Israeli troops entered Lebanon, pursuing the Iranian proxy "Hezbollah," which began shelling Israeli territory.
Renowned British historian Niall Ferguson, in a very popular publication in the US The Free Press, seriously questions whether the war in Iran will escalate into a third world war. What do you think—is a third world war on the horizon?
The War Spreads
Fadi Khraibe: I think we need to define what we mean by a third world war. Considering that today there is a large-scale war in Europe and simultaneously a very large-scale war in the Middle East, both geographically and in terms of scale, we are practically already in a third world war.
Arkady Dubnov: I generally avoid talking about a third world war as the main thing that should concern us all. There is simply a real war that is already capturing continents. You can call it a world war or not, but from school, which we graduated from many, many years ago, we imagine that a world war is a clash of world powers, and primarily as if even nuclear powers. Since the mid-last century, when the victors in World War II became nuclear powers, a world war was perceived as a nuclear war in case of their confrontation. Today in Europe, we see a confrontation of one nuclear power with a border of another, once a nuclear power. I mean the short time of Ukraine, which before the removal of the former Soviet arsenal could be considered, so to speak, nuclear. And we see a little more than a border conflict between the first Islamic nuclear country, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Thank God, everyone understands that it is unlikely to escalate into a global conflict with the use of nuclear weapons. Because, in my view, and not only mine, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is under reliable control of the United States, in any case, they understand there that without the Americans, the Pakistani generals will not dare to use it. So I would answer this question negatively. There is no world war yet.
Still, the responsibility of the main world leaders is high enough that they do not allow themselves to be drawn into a global-scale confrontation
Yevgenia Albats: And the fact that the war is spreading in the Middle East and already capturing more and more countries? We know from history how it was in World War II when it captured Europe, was fought in Africa, the Pacific, and Asia.
Arkady Dubnov: Still, the responsibility of the main world leaders is high enough that they do not allow themselves to be drawn into such a confrontation. Look, of the three most heavily armed nuclear countries, only the United States is actively participating in the war today, and even then not hinting that they might use tactical nuclear weapons, unlike one known nuclear country. And in this nuclear country I am talking about, marginal people mention it. In the third nuclear country, China, they are even more striving to keep everyone else from sliding to this threshold.
Yevgenia Albats: Just for the sake of completeness of the analysis, I will remind you that Russia is able to wage war in Ukraine for four years primarily thanks to China, because otherwise, it would not have the components necessary for missiles, and thanks to Iran, which allowed Russia to receive or produce 32 or 33 thousand drones. And the fact that Russia has begun providing Iran with intelligence data suggests that Russia is somehow helping its ally Iran.
Tell me, the fact that the president of Iran apologized for strikes on neighboring countries and promised not to attack them, and a representative of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps immediately stated that the president's statement was "unprofessional, weak, and completely unacceptable," and at the same time one of the members of the Supreme Islamic Court stated that Iran reserves the right to bomb American targets, is it not evidence of a split in the Iranian elite? Or do we want to see what is not yet in Iran?
Historically, very often the president of Iran was like a valve, a vent that released steam accumulated in the population, and could make statements less radical than the position of the IRGC or the position of the ayatollahs
Fadi Khraibe: I wouldn't say it's a split. But the fact that there are different currents in Iran, including slightly more liberal ones than the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is obvious. The president in Iran is an elected position. Yes, he goes through a filter, the ayatollahs must allow him to run. But historically, very often the president of Iran was like a valve, a vent that released steam accumulated in the population, and could make statements less radical than the position of the IRGC or the position of the ayatollahs. Therefore, I wouldn't say there's anything new here. It's clear who's in charge: it's the IRGC and the new ayatollah, who was elected—the son of the killed Khamenei. The president can make any statements. They can be coordinated, a kind of good cop, bad cop game, or not, but in fact, we see that Iran continues to bomb all the countries of the Arab Gulf, and not only American bases. We see that a government building in Kuwait was bombed, a drone hit Dubai airport, and so on.
Stranger Among His Own
Arkady Dubnov: Since the beginning of January, I have repeatedly allowed myself to draw attention to the figure of President Pezeshkian. I assumed that some perturbations might occur, as a result of which the world or those who are fighting Iran today will have to deal with him.
Yevgenia Albats: Why? We know that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps controls the main businesses in the country, the main revenues. The new spiritual leader of Iran, the son of the deceased Ayatollah Khamenei, is also closely associated with the IRGC. Why might more moderate politicians in Iran prevail? What base do they have?
Arkady Dubnov: I was reasoning in a slightly different plane. I was talking about the fact that at the moment when mass protests began in Iran, Pezeshkian began to assert that people, students, and merchants need to be listened to. That they have legitimate demands, they need to be heeded, and even negotiations should be entered into. And this kind of gave one direction for a possible solution. I'm not saying he will win or achieve this goal. I'm saying that attention needs to be paid to him. Moreover, even 2–3 days ago, I wrote that I am very glad that he was not among those who were destroyed in the last strike on the leadership because this, in my opinion, left a chance for the emergence of a figure with whom external actors could negotiate. If Pezeshkian were shown that they want and are ready to deal with him, it would be a chance for him. Instead, other forces opposing the current Tehran began to extol the absolutely, in my opinion, empty figure of Prince Pahlavi.
Yevgenia Albats: And who extols him? Trump said that the son of Shah Pahlavi is unlikely to become the leader of Iran. He is also written about as a playboy, that he fled the country very young with his family, and so on.
Arkady Dubnov: Today's world media is very different, and the figure of Pahlavi is noticeably inflated, while Pezeshkian receives no attention at all. I continue to think that Pezeshkian as a political figure has not lost his potential as a negotiator. You cannot treat this country as an absolutely homogeneous social and political entity. It seems to me that a more thorough approach to finding figures for compromise is needed.
Iran Against All
Yevgenia Albats: How long are the Gulf countries willing to endure attacks on them? Iran's attack on the infrastructure of these countries is extremely unexpected.
Fadi Khraibe: Why unexpected? It seems to me that this could have been predicted with great certainty, they were grabbing the hands of the US and Trump even a month before the military operation began. And I am sure that through hidden channels they tried to grab the hands of Israel as well. But since for the conservative leadership of Iran, for the IRGC and the ayatollahs, this is a struggle for life and death, they will use all the arsenal of military capabilities they have. The main lever is raising the price of oil, gas, and other energy carriers to a level where in America and Europe it will begin to affect domestic politics, because from their point of view, this is the only way to stop the operation. And raising the price of oil is very simple: close the Strait of Hormuz and bomb fields and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf countries. Unfortunately, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Qatar seem to lack leverage over Trump.
Yevgenia Albats: How long can Iran keep the Strait of Hormuz closed?
Fadi Khraibe: And it doesn't necessarily have to keep it closed. The mere risk that something might fly in will significantly increase insurance rates for ships passing through this strait. If the Iranians demonstratively send a missile or drone there at least once a week, it will make oil transportation through the strait economically inefficient due to the rise in ship insurance prices.
Yevgenia Albats: You mentioned that for shale oil to be profitable, a price of 65, 75, 80 dollars per barrel is needed. It is already higher now. Does this mean that shale oil production in the US will increase sharply?
Fadi Khraibe: No, because oil companies planning drilling and exploration there understand that the military operation may end at any moment, and the price of oil may normalize. Therefore, signing up for projects with a payback period of 4–5–7 years doesn't make sense. No one can guarantee that the price will remain at 90 or 100 dollars for the next five years.
Yevgenia Albats: Does this mean that the United States will not be able to supply enough oil to world markets to stop the price increase?
Fadi Khraibe: They will not be able to replace the volume that is currently lost due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and because Saudi Arabia and Qatar are reducing energy production because they cannot export it. This is an unrealistic scenario. The situation can be temporarily alleviated by releasing the strategic reserve in America or Europe, which has not yet been done. But this will also ease the situation for a couple of weeks, which will not change the situation drastically. The question for everyone is how long the military operation will last. If there were an obvious forecast or at least the strategic goals that the Trump administration plans to achieve were clear, then something could be planned. But no one can rule out that tomorrow Trump will come out and say: "I have achieved all my goals, we have a great victory, and we are wrapping up." Therefore, no one will invest money in additional production.
Hits on Israel
Yevgenia Albats: What is happening in Israel today? I address this primarily to Arkady, who lives there.
Arkady Dubnov: Different things are happening in Israel. I mean, in terms of the differentiation of threats posed by rockets, ballistics launched by Iran. It turned out that the center of Israel and the north, especially in connection with "Hezbollah" attacks from Lebanon, are in the most vulnerable position.
Yevgenia Albats: So the new missile defense weapon that Israel has just launched still cannot cover the north?
Arkady Dubnov: No one said that protection could be one hundred percent. Even theoretically. Therefore, conversations are conversations, but in practice, I can say, the intensity of rocket launches is decreasing over time. Jerusalem, where I live, is less vulnerable than the center and north of Israel in terms of military danger.
Yevgenia Albats: Do you feel that Iran has fewer ballistic missiles and they are using more drones?
In Israel, there is a fairly high level of discipline among people, they try to listen to the instructions of the home front service. In addition, there is slightly less domestic political rage, attacks on the ruling coalition, and retaliatory attacks on the opposition
Arkady Dubnov: I can't make arithmetic calculations here and answer with numbers in hand. But I want to say something else: I see a fairly high level of discipline among people, they generally try to listen to the instructions of the home front service.
In addition, there is slightly less domestic political rage, attacks on the ruling coalition, on Netanyahu, and retaliatory attacks on the opposition. Because in the current situation, it would be completely unreasonable and inappropriate.
Yevgenia Albats: And what do they say about how long this war will last?
Arkady Dubnov: No one knows. You have to ask the American leader. In my opinion, Trump is constantly probing with his finger where he can put an end to the war. Each of his statements testifies to this.
Lebanon and "Hezbollah"
Yevgenia Albats: Fadi, you lived in Lebanon and know it well. "Hezbollah" predictably began shelling Israel. There is even a conspiracy theory that Israel provoked this to start a ground operation in Lebanon. What do you know? To what extent is the Lebanese government ready to disarm "Hezbollah"? And do you think Lebanon will be fully drawn into this war?
Fadi Khraibe: Lebanon is already fully drawn into this war. Unfortunately, because it will bring nothing good to it, whatever the outcome. And regarding disarmament, there were some agreements, unclear how clear, that "Hezbollah" would disarm and withdraw its military units from southern Lebanon. This did not happen. The Lebanese state is not able to disarm or implement this by force. The Lebanese army lacks both the numbers and resources for this. And politically, the Lebanese state lacks determination. Everyone hoped that this would somehow resolve itself, but it did not. And here we are again in a situation of "Hezbollah"'s war with Israel.
Yevgenia Albats: Even though "Hezbollah" has lost its leaders, lost a large number of rockets, and Iran can no longer help it, "Hezbollah" remains a serious force?
Fadi Khraibe: For the IRGC and the ruling elite of Iran, this is a situation of struggle for life and death. And they use all resources, including "Hezbollah," no matter how weakened it is.
Iran and the Ukrainian Question
Yevgenia Albats: A question for Kirill Rogov. To what extent do you think the war in the Middle East can affect Russia's war in Ukraine? I can say that from the American media space, Ukraine has completely disappeared.
Kirill Rogov: It seems to me that this is quite natural because such large-scale hostilities with the direct involvement of American troops will push everything out, it's a competition that cannot be won. There, after all, the war has been stagnating for 5 years, and here the stakes are very high. But this is a temporary phenomenon, it seems to me. Ukraine and Iran are two issues closely linked in Trump's foreign policy. But unlike the Biden administration, in Trump's agenda, the Ukrainian question and the Iranian question were in a different sequence, the Iranian question had much greater significance from the very beginning. For the Trump administration, solving the Iranian issue was a priority and implied the desirability of Russia's and Putin's neutrality, not provoking Putin's hostility, because it was Putin who had the opportunity to provide Iran with those military capabilities that would most complicate the military operation. This is the S-400 complex and Su-35 aircraft. And Putin skillfully sold Iran to the West as his card, as his trump card, which he had in his pocket, for 20 years. He played on America's fears that he would provide military assistance to Tehran and negotiated with Trump on the Ukrainian issue, keeping this trump card up his sleeve or in his pocket. This significantly limited Trump's approaches to the Ukrainian issue, it seems to me.
The outcome of the war will again be very important. If this war ends in failure for Trump, if he fails to radically solve the Iranian problem a second time, it will leave Putin in a strong position, and he will continue to threaten that he can provide both economic and military assistance to Tehran. And if the Iranian problem is solved and disappears, it will greatly limit Putin and put him in a much weaker position. And I think this is much more significant than what everyone is talking about—that Putin benefits from the rise in oil prices. Most likely, this rise will be short-lived, and the gain is not as significant as the change in the geopolitical balance that will occur if Putin loses the Iran card and he doesn't have this trump card in his pocket. Or the price of the joker will increase if the American operation does not succeed because we see that the coalition of the United States and Israel lacks the strength to solve the issue militarily.
Yevgenia Albats: What do you mean by the success or failure of the United States in the war in Iran?
Kirill Rogov: I think success can be considered the collapse of statehood in its current form and a regime change. I am not an Iran specialist and would listen to specialists, but I would suggest discussing this question: has a regime change already occurred, only in the other direction? This is not the republic that was a few years ago. Today Iran is effectively led by the IRGC, it is the main political force that holds and cements everything. In some sense, this is a different regime than the one that existed in Iran for 45 years.
Fadi Khraibe: No, it seems to me that this regime is not different. It is the same as it was starting from 1991 when the Iran-Iraq war ended. Just the IRGC and the clerics-conservatives have been gaining more strength and had more opportunities. But as they controlled both the street, the army, and the economy, they continue to control them.
Yevgenia Albats: Trump lifted secondary sanctions on Russian oil for 30 days. I understand that they agreed with Putin and India that India will quickly start processing Russian oil to supply it to the market and thus bring down the price. How much is this a success for Putin?
While the Strait of Hormuz is blocked, this is a catastrophic situation. As soon as it disappears, everything will fall into place because oil production in the world is growing faster than consumption. There is an excess of oil. In this sense, Putin's luck is short-lived
Kirill Rogov: This is a success for Putin because the oil and gas revenues of the Russian budget for January-February are exactly 50% of the revenues of January-February twenty-fifth year. This is a serious thing. In this sense, he has now received a gift. But the question is how events will develop. While it concerns oil previously shipped and which was on the water, these tankers did not know who would take them and were drifting in the ocean. As far as I understand, the thirty-day permit concerns this oil, but if the situation continues in the same vein as now, there will be another permit for new oil. Again, while the Strait of Hormuz is blocked, this is a catastrophic situation. As soon as it disappears, everything will fall into place because oil production in the world is growing faster than consumption. There is an excess of oil. In this sense, Putin's luck is short-lived.
Yevgenia Albats: Fadi, you are an oilman, do you agree with what Kirill says?
Fadi Khraibe: I agree that 30 days is a short-term patch, it will not change the situation in terms of oil price dynamics while the strait is closed. I think that after the end of hostilities, everything will depend very much on how much the oil and gas infrastructure in the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, turns out to be destroyed. If it is seriously destroyed, then the price of oil may remain high for quite a long time.
Exit from the War
Yevgenia Albats: Former US Secretary of State Blinken, when asked what way out of the war the United States has and how it can all end, said that in fact, it can end very simply and very quickly. Trump can declare that Iranian leader Ali Khamenei has been killed, a change of power has occurred, Iran's military capabilities have been completely destroyed, namely, launchers have been destroyed, the production of ballistic missiles and drone stocks have been eliminated. And what, from your point of view, will be perceived as a victory for the US and Israel, and what will be considered a defeat?
Arkady Dubnov: What can become an acceptable result for everyone? In any case, there will be no public capitulation. This is an eastern despotism, this is Iran. And this must be taken into account when engaging in public polemics with these guys at the very top. I think that one way or another, we will have to come to some compromise that will allow Iran to retreat, withdraw, without being an absolutely defeated loser in the world Islamic ummah. I hope smart people will persuade Trump to slightly lower the offensive tone towards all Iranians, which Trump still abuses. You can't humiliate them all the time. You need to hit, eliminate all enriched uranium stocks, do it with operational, military, whatever means. But the rhetoric that will be sold to the world should strive for some acceptable, marketable compromise that will allow both sides to win.
At some point, Trump will declare a complete victory in the war and end it with a salute and a parade on Pennsylvania Avenue. How will the world react to this? Unfortunately, Trump doesn't care
Fadi Khraibe: We have a recent example of the twelve-day war when Trump came out and said: "That's it, we defeated everyone, bombed everything, and Iran will never have nuclear weapons now." How much this was confirmed by facts, we do not know. And how much the outside world believed in all this—rather no than yes.
But the main thing is that Trump's voter, who voted based on the fact that America will not engage in long military adventures, believed in this. It seems to me that this is the most likely scenario, given that this year is an election year, and Trump will find a point, which Arkady talks about, which is more marketable for his voters, namely the MAGA voters: at some point, he will declare a complete victory in the war and end it with a salute and a parade on Pennsylvania Avenue. How will the world react to this? Unfortunately, Trump doesn't care. I think that only domestic political alignments will influence his further actions.
Kirill Rogov: I adhere to the point of view that there was no alternative to this war. If a year and a half ago it seemed that the problem was in the degree of uranium enrichment, the amount of enriched uranium, and Iran's proximity to creating nuclear weapons, then in the last year it became clear that there is a second problem. It became clear from the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which showed that the balance of power in missile weapons has changed, that the system of missile-drone attacks makes the accumulated air defense resources of Western countries, Israel, and America insufficient, and that over the past year and a half, Iran is increasing its missiles. And very soon, a moment will come when Israel will not be able to contain these combined attacks with its air defense means. Therefore, the destruction of the missile arsenal is necessary as soon as possible to contain the imbalance that will soon arise. There is no alternative to this. Secondly, I think there is a very simple formula for victory in this war. It is the removal of enriched uranium. If this is done, everyone can say that the war is won and calm down for a while.
IRGC Against Iran
Yevgenia Albats: At what point can a regime change occur in Iran?
Fadi Khraibe: I would talk not about a change, but about the collapse of the current regime, as it was in Libya or Syria, and the transition to a situation of chaos. I think that with active actions by the US and Israel in the air, plus the involvement of Kurdish, Azerbaijani, and other groups on the ground, the situation can be brought to chaos, destabilization, and civil war. A regime change, which implies that clerics and the IRGC will leave power, and more liberal, more balanced politicians, including President Pezeshkian, will come in their place, is unlikely to lead to this. I don't see a realistic scenario that can lead to this.
Arkady Dubnov: I generally agree with Fadi. For me, the nightmare is the threat of the involvement of Iraqi Kurdish militias, despite the well-understood by me sense of historical justice, the desire to create their own state that drives them. If the Kurdish militia can be kept under American control and chaos is not allowed (and chaos in this region will indeed ignite the entire Middle East), then this pressure can lead to some evolution of the regime. However, I agree that there will be no regime change in Iran.
Kirill Rogov: I still adhere to the point of view I formulated, that in some sense, a regime change has occurred, just not in the direction we would like. This is already a new situation, we will see it because the ability of the IRGC to suppress any rebellion and protest against the regime is not equal to the ability to govern the country in a new situation. In this sense, it also seems to me that we are already seeing the beginning of the regime's collapse. It can turn into another regime, in which the IRGC plays the main role and sets the tone, and not at all into what we would like.
I completely agree that the scenario is most likely negative, that the force that could remove the radical top of the IRGC is not visible. Accordingly, the transition to some more modern state structure is also not visible. And the reason is clear: the IRGC leadership understands that if they lose, it will be the end for them, they will be destroyed. Therefore, they will destroy Iran to the end. They are saving their skin and thereby destroying Iran.
Video Version
* Yevgenia Albats, Arkady Dubnov, Kirill Rogov are declared "foreign agents" in the Russian Federation.
Photo: Focus.ua / Rtvi / Kirill Rogov's social networks.