Vladimir Putin meets with representatives of Russian business circles in Moscow. May 26, 2025. Photo AFP
Yevgenia Albats*: Putin has gone absolutely crazy, «Putin has gone completely crazy» — wrote U.S. President Donald Trump on his social network Truth Social after a three-day fierce bombing of Ukrainian cities by Russian drones and advanced Iskander missiles. Dozens of people were injured and killed, including three children. In one family alone, three children were killed, and their mother died later in the hospital. And almost simultaneously, the Russian nomenclature holds the St. Petersburg Legal Forum. They invite not just anyone, but representatives of the completely medieval movement «Taliban», which prohibits women from studying, working, showing their faces, and even speaking in public. And this very «Taliban» shares its experience of prison management with the Russian nomenclature. And they call this «Russian civilization», a formula repeated by Mr. Karaganov, followed by some American professors.
Tell me, do you also think that Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin has gone crazy, or is something happening that I completely fail to understand?
Andrey Kolesnikov: This could be called collective madness because what is being said by people related to the Russian establishment truly crosses the boundaries of ordinary etiquette, decency, and some reasonable notions about the world. It is done with deliberate audacity, I would say, because it is not just allowed; it is morally encouraged behavior, it is not just permissible, it is necessary to do. Just as deputies compete in a race of loyalty through new and wild legislative initiatives, so do any officials, any figures compete in making the most outrageous statements. Moreover, this happens at a rather modest forum, which never played the role of a platform where thoughts and ideas revealing the true essence of this regime were expressed. As if they have stripped and are showing what tattoos they have on their bodies. But this is not madness in the medical sense. This is political madness, conscious, it is part of the political regime and the ideology on which it is built.
It must be said that this happened on other platforms as well. Lavrov spoke at a forum called «Southern Russian Lands». He spoke in Yerevan in front of Russian-speaking students. At the same time, the 23rd assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy was taking place, where the cream of our foreign policy expert elite gathers, and Lavrov spoke before them. With a secret speech — he spent the first five minutes expressing gratitude, said something about multipolarity and neocolonialism, and then asked journalists and cameras to leave. Something incredibly interesting was said there, but at the same forum, a document was presented and discussed (I understand, written by Karaganov) «A Living Idea-Dream. The Code of the Russian Person».
Yevgenia Albats: From Karaganov «The Code of the Russian Person» — that's great.
Andrey Kolesnikov: There was also talk about the cult of consumption. I note that he was surrounded by wealthy people. There were quite standard calls for modest behavior, for contempt for all things material, and so on. But everything that has been developed since the time of Count Uvarov through the Slavophiles, to our bearers of the «Russian Party» of the 60s-70s. All this was simply collected in this composition, and all this was discussed in various sessions.
Ilya Shablinsky: I think Trump chose some sharp form of reaction in his statement. He understands that everyone expects a response from him. And he found such a form. It is clear what he wanted to say. But it is important that Trump draws some conclusions after this phrase. That corrections follow in his political line.
And Putin, most likely, made some decision. This is not an act of madness. He, judging by everything, preferred the continuation of the war to any deal with the USA. Or he believes that the deal will not escape him anyway. But he, I think, is still mistaken. Bombing peaceful cities in a row, civilian objects — this is an act of intimidation, moral pressure on the Ukrainian population, on the world. At the same time, Putin gives the order to strike, and Russian diplomats are rude and provide a theoretical basis for this. Now this is their style. Partly a reflection of this was the forum in St. Petersburg. You can try to analyze what was said there from a legal point of view, but we understand that this is not an object of legal analysis. It was a contest of sycophancy. A contest of servility. People holding very high positions, receiving large sums of money, chose the role of political serfs. Well, they chose and chose, but this requires some ingenuity. So they invented, competed in this with each other.
Stages of Decline
Yevgenia Albats: Ilya, you worked in the Federation Council, the CEC, the Human Rights Council. I think you were removed from the Human Rights Council at the same time as other regime-critical people, in 2019. Nevertheless, you held on for quite a long time, 19 years of Putin's rule. Do you see evolution, or was everything around you the same, but you thought it was necessary to try to do something inside this zoo?
Since 2016, Putin stopped being interested in topics like someone being imprisoned, someone being tortured, about the anti-Semitism of prosecutors, and such cases were more and more — Putin was not interested in all this. He talked about one thing — why aren't you paying attention to what is happening in Donbass
Ilya Shablinsky: I believe there was evolution. It went, so to speak, from 2003, from the arrest of Khodorkovsky. The last stage was — 2016, 2017, when Putin decided to intensify the war or find some ways to separate the Donetsk and Luhansk regions from Ukraine and considered different options. Since 2016, he spoke about one thing at Council meetings, he stopped being interested in topics like someone being imprisoned, someone being tortured, about the anti-Semitism of prosecutors, and such cases were more and more — Putin was not interested in all this. He demanded — why aren't you paying attention to what is happening in Donbass? He fixated on this. In 2013, he told the Council meeting how he saved Snowden, how Snowden called from Hong Kong on the phone to the FSB, and Putin had to decide where to put him. And he decided that he should be let in here and somehow saved. After that, he calmly told us (this was 2013, November): after all, oppressing a human rights defender is like shaving a pig — a lot of squealing, little wool. Then there was a pause. It seemed we were supposed to laugh. An awkward silence hung.
Yevgenia Albats: A lot of squealing, little wool. That's his qualification of human rights defenders.
Ilya Shablinsky: Yes. After which he continued the conversation about how we should help human rights defenders, like I saved Snowden. This was 2013. Relatively vegetarian times, because at the same time we were talking about releasing the girls from «Pussy Riot». And Putin unexpectedly somehow hinted that he was not against it, let them be released on amnesty. This is another stage of evolution. This is still before Crimea.
In 2014, we — Lena Masyuk, Sasha Verkhovsky, I — wrote a draft statement of protest against the military invasion of Crimea. And almost 30 members of the Council voted for it. Just a little short of a majority. There was a wild scandal. <The then head of the Council Mikhail> Fedotov was promised to be fired. There was a meeting, 2-3 people from the administration came, and they yelled at Fedotov, at us. We thought that now we would be expelled from the Council, and good. For a reason. A good reason. No. They left all of us — Elena, Svanidze, and me in the Council.
But then everything got worse, worse, worse. And the last stage of evolution — this is 16-17 years when Putin became interested only in foreign policy. And he was only ready to talk about this. Externally, he did not change much, but he began to interrupt, did not listen to the end, because we irritated him. At the same time, we sat until 2018, some until 2019, and in 19, he, apparently, decided to kill Navalny**.
The Language of Hatred
Yevgenia Albats: Andrey, your recent column in The New Times about how Russian diplomats have switched to a new language. Style — it is not only a person. Style — it is also a political regime. We remember how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the person of Nebenzya, Russia's representative to the United Nations, switched to the language of the back alley. And it is clear why. This is the language of the Chekists, who have taken almost everything under control. But after all, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could say — we are diplomats, we need to adhere to the strictness of formulations. Still, Dmitry Peskov, in response to Trump's words about Putin being crazy, said: well, now is such a difficult time, we all allow ourselves emotional statements. That is, he did not respond in Lavrov's style. And the Ministry of Foreign Affairs switched to this language, and not only Zakharova but also the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Do you have an explanation?
Andrey Kolesnikov: Even Ryabkov, who was highly regarded as a diplomat, who deeply understands his narrow problems and was highly regarded by many as a negotiator with the Americans on nuclear issues, which should generally constitute much of the content of Russian diplomacy now — even he switched to this language of the late 40s — early 50s, when derogatory turns could be used towards ideological opponents. When there was a complete break with the West. And this is a sign that the people who say this do not even hope that they will ever sit at the negotiating table with any of the European leaders. With Macron, with Starmer, with von der Leyen. That the Putin regime is very long-lasting, enough for their lifetime, and therefore they are freed from this politeness, from diplomatic expressions.
The fact that Peskov is more careful — he generally has a less boorish style, he is restrained, he is evasive, especially when it comes to Trump. Trump is a person who cannot be missed, who should remain our Russian partner, with whom some economic deals will be concluded later or in parallel with military actions. It is very important not to offend Trump. They see Trump as a source of investments that are desperately needed in a situation where the economy is beginning to experience very serious erosion. And it is now becoming more or less obvious.
No one believes that Putin will want to establish a truce. Their task, obviously, is to stretch the negotiation period as long as possible to advance further to the West, to conquer more territories. How long can they act like this? A lot depends on Trump and his patience. So far, he speaks out, but does nothing.
Maybe Lavrov and others have come to understand that this regime is forever, until the end of their lives. No illusions are needed, they need to serve this regime to stay afloat with everyone
Yevgenia Albats: We remember Karaganov in different phases of his development. He tried for quite a long time to show that he was more of a pro-Western person. Then the war began. And suddenly Karaganov became completely frozen, shouting that the West should be hit with a nuclear bomb. What does Karaganov's evolution say? After all, one could quietly sit, continue teaching at the Higher School of Economics, receive very good money, and not run ahead of everyone.
Andrey Kolesnikov: The thing is, no one would have shot for relatively quiet support. Most adapt, try to comply with the rules. Partly this is the Soviet school of swaying with the party line. Karaganov's turn is apparently caused by some very strong emotional frustration, if we speak from a psychological point of view. It is hard to believe that this is sincere. Although we know an example of sincere patriotic hysteria in the history of the First World War, when intellectuals of all countries in the First World War were terribly possessed by pro-war sentiment. They hated people of another nation. I am now rereading «The World of Yesterday» by Stefan Zweig, where this is very well described on the example of Austria and France, how intellectuals, professors hated «enemies».
Ilya Shablinsky: I found a whole reasoning on this account by Sigmund Freud in August 1914. «For the first time in my life, I am proud to be an Austrian. Finally, we will give a rebuff». Well, how?
Andrey Kolesnikov: Yes, then it smoothed out a bit, but for the first two years, people were eager to punish the enemies. Maybe there is such an intention here, which then turned into an understanding for the same Lavrov that this regime is forever, until the end of their lives. No illusions are needed, they need to serve this regime to stay afloat with everyone. Anyway, it will not end earlier than in 15-20 years. And in 15-20 years, they will no longer be in this world. People are not very young. Putin is being rejuvenated, he may live to be a hundred years old, but they are people of a lower flight. Maybe such motivation exists, otherwise how else to explain this? Because what is said and written in the reports is absolute nonsense. This is all that Russian elites have gone through dozens, hundreds of times, in Russian history, it is all present. Nothing new, the same messianism, the same special path, the special role of the Russian people, the state-civilization. This new ideology is now being actively promoted and even codified in textbooks, in presidential decrees, in a dictionary. A dictionary is even being created with all sorts of correct words, including those describing our special spirituality. This needs to be explained. The Russian people, they are such and such, fifth-tenth. And the non-Russian people — they are different, they are bad. And they have always been bad, and they have always attacked us. The situation changes, the discourse of power changes, as now with the Americans, and this even affects the moods of the population.
Ilya Shablinsky: Do you remember the article by Naryshkin, the head of the foreign intelligence service? He claims that the original enemy of Russia and the Russian people — Anglo-French imperialists. The whole article is an attempt to create some new ideological framework, but it does not pull on ideology. These are fragmentary sketches, from which, I think, nothing holistic will come out. Andrey said that the fascination with traditionalism and radical nationalism has been encountered over the past 100-120 years both in the Romanov Empire and in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev spoke about the fact that we are the creators of a unique Soviet civilization, a civilization of a new type. Speechwriters proposed a construction, he liked it, but they did not have time to develop this idea. In general, these are artificial constructions, and they are worthless. But they will try to feed the youth with them in the coming years. But Putin, Patrushev, and others — are not young people, they do not have much time, so they are in a hurry.
The Phenomenon of Bastrykin
Yevgenia Albats: I can't help but ask you about Bastrykin, at the St. Petersburg Legal Forum, the head of the Investigative Committee shocked everyone a little. Suddenly compared Mariupol, which the Russian army leveled with the ground, with the besieged Leningrad. The second incident, when he suddenly quoted Alexei Navalny «Russia will be free». And in general, he soloed at this forum — a person who is remembered in St. Petersburg for driving a pink convertible with girls. What is all this about?
Ilya Shablinsky: Of something legally significant, it is worth recalling his statement regarding the rights of migrants, the oppression of persons who recently acquired citizenship of the Russian Federation. Bastrykin chose his main direction as pressure on migrants from Central Asia. Remember, he managed to say that 20 thousand citizens who recently acquired Russian citizenship are already fighting.
Yevgenia Albats: But explain, what does he express?
Ilya Shablinsky: Radical ethnic nationalism.
Yevgenia Albats: So they are shifting from imperial nationalism to ethnic nationalism?
Ilya Shablinsky: Yes, they are shifting. The basis was imperial nationalism because there are Tatars, Bashkirs, representatives of the Caucasian republics nearby, and people like Bastrykin could not immediately press on Russian nationalism. But they are slowly moving towards it. Bastrykin is not a very sophisticated person, this line comes to the fore for him. And this may ultimately affect policy. He managed to express satisfaction at this forum that some Russian schoolchildren somehow humiliate, bully non-Russians. «Well, at least there», remember? This is his current line. And I think that modern «black hundreds», all these «Russian communities» are curated by the Investigative Committee, literally reproducing the logic of the actions of that «black hundred» that was a hundred years ago.
As for Mariupol, the explanation is very simple — he was drunk, he just sincerely blurted out his impressions, and he spoke, I think, sincerely. It just did not fit with what is customary to say in their clique. They don't talk about Mariupol being under Russian blockade for three months, now it is customary to say that the city is being rebuilt, revived, hooray-hooray. And he said something like that. Because he was really shocked. Well, what is on the mind of a sober person, a drunk person, as you understand, is on the tongue. That's all.
Transformation of Nationalism
Yevgenia Albats: There is a transformation of imperial nationalism, its conversion into ethnic nationalism, you say. We remember how the Putin regime suddenly began to imprison Russian nationalists — Demushkin, Belov, Krylov. One of our most famous specialists in various forms of nationalism, Professor Emil Pain, said that for Putin's purposes, for the purpose of reviving the Russian Empire, not Russian nationalism is needed, but unification: on one side Chechens, on the other Bashkirs, on the third Buryats, Altaians, who are now dying completely disproportionately to the size of their peoples, constitute, as I understand it, along with convicts, the basis of the Russian army. Therefore, the Putin regime cannot afford ethnic nationalism. But judging by what you, Andrey, said about Karaganov's report, and what Ilya says about Bastrykin's statements, there is a transformation in favor of the Russian people, as Comrade Stalin said after the war.
Andrey Kolesnikov: In this case, one does not contradict the other, because there is a certain Russian empire that under the roof of Russian civilization unites all other peoples. These peoples, according to their logic, are second-rate, but they are kind of ours because they are inside Russian civilization. And Karaganov's report, in fact, begins with this. With the fact that we gather different peoples, but there is a state-forming Russian people. All peoples are equal, but there is one people that...
Yevgenia Albats: More equal than others.
Andrey Kolesnikov: More equal than others — this is already a national-imperial formation. And already, frankly, contempt for other peoples and other confessions. When Lavrov says — well, how can we meet in the Vatican when we are two Orthodox countries. And according to the Constitution, Russia is a secular state, where the church is separated from the state, where there are different confessions, and they are equal. It turns out there are confessions that are more equal than others. So this logic works quite well.
As for extreme nationalists, they were certainly controlled by someone, but those who cross a certain line find themselves in a danger zone. They will be punished under political articles just as liberals are punished. Yes, the system is nationalistic and imperial, but it does not allow its subjects to go beyond systemic activities. You either be with us, within our structures, there are many of these structures, we will give you money for the same «Russian communities» — please, work, guys. But if you pursue an independent policy, make a career out of it, like Strelkov-Girkin, well, sorry, even if you are the father of the «Russian spring», but these merits are not taken into account, you went practically against the system, we punish you for this.
Cosmopolitans already exist. They have a social color. These are «foreign agents» and «undesirables». Carriers of «destructive globalist liberal ideology». Terms are already appearing quite clear
Yevgenia Albats: So, your logic is that the Russian state remains on the positions of imperial nationalism, but when necessary, ethnic nationalism will be included. Does this mean that the next step is the fight against cosmopolitans?
Andrey Kolesnikov: Cosmopolitans already exist...
Yevgenia Albats: You mean foreign agents?
Andrey Kolesnikov: They have a social color. These are «foreign agents» and «undesirables». Carriers of «destructive globalist liberal ideology». Terms are already appearing quite clear. Not necessarily Jews, these can be completely Russian people. Of course, this very much resembles Stalin's post-war policy of fighting cosmopolitanism. It was very ethnically colored, but the underlying motive was the same — they are still hirelings. Hirelings of the West, Anglo-American imperialism, they undermine our regime from within.
War is More Important than Trump
Yevgenia Albats: Ilya, how does ethnic nationalism, which, as Andrey says, is combined with imperial nationalism, combine with hugs with Trump and the obvious desire to befriend America against Europe?
Ilya Shablinsky: This is purely political conjuncture, which for the current diplomatic corps, for ideologists, for propagandists presents a difficult task, but they, look, in two and a half months managed to write quite a lot about the fact that America is not our enemy, we have a lot in common with them, and mainly Europe is messing things up, the British are messing things up. A turn in the spirit of Orwell, it is purely conjunctural and can be canceled. This is a maneuver that, apparently, Putin approved. It is important to Putin.
Donald Trump speaks with journalists at Morristown Airport, New Jersey, USA. May 26, 2025. Photo AP
But war is more important to Putin. For me, this was also a puzzle. It seemed to me in February that Putin would agree to some compromise and stop, that it was enough for him to reach Pokrovsk, well, and that's it. And then he would try to make some big deal with Trump. No. No. We see that war is more important to him. And this conjunctural turn towards Trump's populist nationalism can be canceled in the next one and a half to two months. Because Trump will have to decide something now. I can't be sure of this, but if Trump quietly begins to turn in support of Ukraine, then Putin will have to cancel the rehabilitation of America. This will be, of course, a funny political somersault, but it is quite likely.
In general, their imperial and Russian ethnic nationalism is in no way compatible with friendship with the USA. Not compatible. It is inorganic. They somehow in recent weeks are linking green and wet. But it seems to me that this is temporary and unstable.
Yevgenia Albats: But Russian nationalism is quite compatible with Chinese nationalism. All of Xi Jinping's policy is built precisely on Chinese nationalism.
Ilya Shablinsky: Yes, absolutely. Putin likes the Chinese experience. Somewhere from his third term, Putin gradually began to substitute the European path of development with the Chinese path. The peculiarity is that on this path he ensures almost vassal relations of Russia with China. This is disadvantageous for Russia from all points of view. Economically, first of all. But Putin began to make this turn, and the adaptation of the state ideology to sinicization is happening gradually, being formalized along the way. They are going down the path of selective repressions. Nationalism in the Chinese spirit. But in China, they have long dealt with minorities. And they are indeed in a clear minority there. In Russia, everything is not like that. In Russia, there is a whole region of Caucasian republics, a significant part of the Muslim population. In general, ethnic nationalism is no joke. Putin took this into account. But he is aging, the situation is becoming more complicated. And he, I think, may at some point decide that any tools should be used to retain power. Any.
For this system to stand, it excites itself, winds itself up, invents more and more enemies for itself where there are no enemies left. This is a sign of erosion of statehood
Yevgenia Albats: Andrey, since you are in Moscow, tell me, how do technocrats relate to all this? People like Elvira Nabiullina, like Mishustin, Kudrin, Vyugin, etc. Or do they behave so quietly that no reactions can be recorded?
Andrey Kolesnikov: This is an absolutely closed caste, undoubtedly. No one knows what they think about themselves. But we understand that there are different people. And someone may accept this as a natural component of the regime that has been built and puts up with it. For someone, these are signs of further savagery and archaization, but what can be done about it? Maybe someone in the legal departments of the government apparatus or the presidential administration is trying to do something, but it is not noticeable because all the terrible legislation, undoubtedly contradicting the Constitution, passes through these filters. And it ends up on the president's desk, and the president signs these laws.
Sometimes something wakes up in the government, and they slightly pause or ask to rework something, but it is cosmetic. I think there are many people inside the system who see signs of non-medical madness, which indicate that the system is moving into a stage of complete totalitarian maturity. True, not yet completely. For this system to stand, it excites itself, winds itself up, it invents more and more enemies for itself where there are no enemies left. This is a sign, perhaps, of the collapse or beginning erosion of statehood. When Justice Minister Chuychenko says that statehood is more important than laws and human rights, he is just talking about the collapse of statehood. Because at the heart of a normal, strong state are institutions, laws that are above the discretion of officials, even if it is the president. And human rights, which must be observed in accordance with the same Constitution. That is, with these laws, they are destroying the foundations of statehood.
Yevgenia Albats: But there must be an instinct for self-preservation. The Russian nomenclature must remember the history of both the tsarist bureaucracy and the Soviet bureaucracy, right?
Andrey Kolesnikov: Many of them believe that this regime will last their lifetime, and they need to behave so recklessly to support this regime, to comply with its rules.
Yevgenia Albats: And how do they look their children in the eyes?
Andrey Kolesnikov: Well, with children, I don't know how they are doing. If we talk about the upper layer, their children all have Western education, and many live in the West. What we once considered a guarantee that they would not bring down the state to such an extent, it turns out, this was not a guarantee. The middle layer just serves, behaves quite quietly. They try not to think about what is happening. Or convince themselves that everything is done correctly. People adapt to the system in which they work. If they believe that the system is outdated, archaic, does not correspond to human rights, then they choose another path: either opposition to this system, or another job, outside this system, or they leave the country. Students do not return because they do not understand how to apply themselves in an authoritarian state. So people adapt. This is a usual adaptation to the circumstances in which you live. This is not an exclusive property of the Russian people.
Yevgenia Albats: Absolutely, absolutely. Just the experience of Soviet power shows that this does not save. That when the tsar, the sovereign decides that a little blood must be shed for others to fear, it does not protect anyone at all. That's what I mean.
Andrey Kolesnikov: It does not protect, yes, and we remember an even closer historical period, the collapse of the Soviet Union, when party members were treated negatively, and there were indeed human tragedies, people ended their lives.
Yevgenia Albats: Ilya Shablinsky, a specific question for you about Sergey Kiriyenko, his evolution from a liberal to the deputy head of Putin's administration. Kiriyenko must understand that he is still an outsider to all this Chekist brotherhood around? Or is he so technocratic that he doesn't care who to serve?
Ilya Shablinsky: My opinion — this is deep adaptation. It does not deceive anyone in his environment. I think Putin roughly understands what Sergey has in mind. But he is effective because he organizes elections. He organizes all major political campaigns.
Yevgenia Albats: Referendums in the occupied regions too.
Ilya Shablinsky: Yes, yes. A person performs dirty work. Nothing, he takes it on. Despite the fact that I think this whole Chekist gang has no illusions about Kiriyenko. They believe he is an outsider. But he copes. Works. Well, live.
Yevgenia Albats: Does Kiriyenko understand what kind of regime they have built in Russia?
Ilya Shablinsky: Of course. They chose two different behavior options. There is Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev, he chose the role of a jester. And Kiriyenko chose the role of a technical advisor. And he found himself in place. He is convenient for Putin. He made such a choice. This is a terrible choice. Indeed, it is easier to leave, not to get into this swamp with dirt and blood. He climbed in. As far as I understand, he tries to avoid loud public statements, not to speak like various Nebenzya, Zakharova, Lavrov. Once Putin made him say something about Ukrainian nationalists. And he wrote an article about why he is against Ukrainian nationalism. This happened once. And in general, he remains silent. He understands everything perfectly. But the person made such a choice...
Video version:
* Yevgenia Albats, Andrey Kolesnikov, Ilya Shablinsky are declared «foreign agents» in Russia.
** Alexei Navalny is included in the register of «terrorists and extremists».