Yevgenia Albats: Speaking in the Israeli parliament, U.S. President Donald Trump declared that the two-year bloody war, which cost tens of thousands of lives, is over. In Sharm el-Sheikh, during a meeting with regional, European, and Turkish leaders, he said Gaza will be demilitarized, Hamas will be disarmed, and Gaza will be rebuilt. But who will demilitarize Gaza? Who will disarm Hamas? How will all this concretely happen? Who will lead Gaza? What about the Hamas members who remain there? What will happen to the weapons and rockets still present? Can one truly say that the war has ended?
“One of the hostages spoke by phone with his favorite singer, and together they sang the very song that sustained him during two years of captivity—a song that allowed him to remain human and not go insane.”
Mikhail Gurevich: On the day of the hostages’ release, from the morning onward all Israelis were glued to their phones. Whether at home, at work, or on public transport—the same scene: people staring at screens, exclaiming, explaining to neighbors what was happening. Throughout the day, especially in the morning, people watched who was released in what order, who was taken to what hospital, how they met with relatives, etc. Then images appeared of family reunions in hospitals and phone calls. For example, one hostage spoke by phone with his favorite singer, and they sang together the song that had kept him alive during two years in captivity—something that allowed him to remain human and not go mad. It was an utterly incredible feeling.
I recall the Passover prayer “Dayenu” (“It would have been enough”)—we say to God: “Thank you, it would have been enough…”—concerning Egypt’s torment, etc. What He has given beyond that, well, it would have been enough, but... Today’s morning had a similar sentiment. And of course Trump’s visit, his flyover of the Tel Aviv coastline, where “Thank you” was spelled out in large letters, the entire road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem draped in flags, large banners saying “Thank you, Donald Trump, you are our victor,” and Trump’s address to the Knesset—I think this was a triumphant moment for him. I don’t know where else he might have received such a reception. Definitely not in Congress, and in any other parliament of the world he would not have felt what he felt in the Knesset—a kind of religious unity, recognition, and gratitude from Jews not only in Israel, but globally, for what he did.
Plus, it was Simchat Torah. Two years ago this was a tragic day; now we start it with utterly extraordinary emotions. A week—no, even three days ago—it was unimaginable that 20 hostages could be released in one day. Every Israeli knows someone who said: “No—Hamas will do something. Hamas just won’t surrender.” And indeed they didn’t surrender completely—they didn’t hand over all bodies of the fallen; this story is not over. Twenty-four deceased hostages have not yet been returned to the land of Israel.
Return All Bodies
Albats: As I understand it, a international commission has been set up which should help locate bodies of the fallen hostages and hand them to the Israeli side so they can be buried according to Jewish law on Israeli soil. What do you know about this commission? Is it international, Arab, Palestinian? Who is handling this?
David Sharp: Such a mechanism exists. The problem is twofold. During intense combat, Hamas, naturally, was highly cautious about losing its “asset”—hostages, living or dead. Bodies of deceased hostages were stored in various secret locations; some people remained responsible for them on the Hamas side or other militant groups. As operations progressed, some militants responsible for storing the bodies were themselves killed or communication with them lost. Hamas doesn’t always know exactly where the bodies are; or they pretend not to know.
Current events suggest that Hamas is artificially delaying the return of bodies to retain bargaining chips, although these are far less valuable than live hostages. However, Israeli, U.S., and intermediary parties understood that besides Hamas’ desire to delay (violating agreement), it also has objective difficulties. Paradoxically, Israeli intelligence in some cases may know the location of bodies better than Hamas. This is not surprising: during wartime Israel often knew where hostages (living or dead) were held. In some cases hostages were released, and bodies located.
Why not free others by force? The answer is simple and complex at once. Military operations to free hostages are only feasible when there is a very high probability of success: recover people alive, without heavy losses. Under extremely complex conditions inside enemy territory, when terrorists were ready to kill hostages instantly if threatened, such operations were not attempted. But intelligence existed. Thus today when Hamas in some places pretends ignorance, or actually is uncertain about bodies’ locations, Israeli intelligence may pass such information—sometimes specific, sometimes general—to an international mechanism involving Arab, Muslim states and possibly EU representatives. These people must go to the indicated locations, in cooperation with Hamas as needed, and literally dig, search for the deceased. Also oversight is needed to ensure Hamas honors the agreement—including the key point of returning every single hostage. Unfortunately, in Israel there is some pessimism that all bodies will be returned, and quickly. Significant delays are likely. One hopes intermediaries, U.S., Israel will find tools to pressure Hamas.
Albats: Let’s explain why it’s so important in Israel to return dead hostages to Israeli soil. In the Soviet Union during WWII, in Russia in the Chechen wars, and now in the war Russia instigated in Ukraine—thousands are missing, many never found. Russian authorities hide those data. Why is returning even the deceased so crucial for Israelis?
“In Israel there are no nameless monuments. And the main task of preserving memory of the Holocaust and the fallen is naming them, speaking names—because there are no nameless victims.”
Mikhail Gurevich: The hostage issue is deeply important to Israelis. Since medieval times we had the tradition pidyon shvuyim—redeeming hostages. Sadly, being taken hostage is a traditional Jewish story. Instead of returning money owed, you could hand over hostages as payment. Jewish communities historically collected funds to redeem hostages. The tradition of rescuing hostages and fighting for them is our national and religious tradition.
As for returning each person: unlike many others, Israel does not have anonymous memorials. In the Holocaust Memorial, every victim has a name, Yad Vashem records names. The essential task is preserving memory by naming, constantly, individually. Returning a hostage’s body is nearly a religious rite. If a person is not buried according to Jewish custom, without a funeral, without Kaddish (mourner’s prayer) at the grave, then in effect that person remains unburied spiritually, their soul unsettled.
Against the backdrop of hostage returns, there have been reports that remains of Eli Cohen, the Israeli spy executed in Damascus in May 1965, might be returned soon. We continue to fight for him, because his remains must be returned and buried according to Jewish custom in Israel—that would “close” that story. Remains of our pilot Ron Arad are still somewhere in Iran. We will continue fighting until Eli and Ron are returned and buried in Israel, where they lived.
Exchange Criteria
Albats: In return for twenty living hostages and twenty-eight dead ones, over 1,500 Palestinian terrorists were exchanged.
Gurevich: To be precise: 250 lifers (those with multiple life sentences) for killing many Israelis. More than 1,700 were prisoners arrested since the war in Gaza for ties to Hamas or other groups—but they were not combatants in Hamas’ “Nukhba” special units; these are not being released now and still face trials. That’s a separate, important issue.
Sharp: Of the 250 lifers, 195 have life sentences; 55 have long (non-life) terms. They released only those with up to 13 life sentences (i.e. responsible for at most 13 deaths). Those with 40, 50, or more lives on their record are not being released. That includes top leaders, commanders, zone chiefs, arrested even during the Second Intifada and responsible for the bloodiest terror attacks. Also two symbolic figures: Ahmed Sa’adat (head of the leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and Marwan Barghouti (potential Fatah leader). These high-level terrorists were not released. This was, to me, a pleasant surprise: I feared Israel would succumb and release every demanded prisoner. Many dangerous terrorists being set free will have negative consequences—but if they had released those two plus others, media, deterrence, future terrorism would all suffer major blow. But Israel defended that principle.
Most of the 1,700 other prisoners are effectively war detainees—arrested in Gaza, not yet convicted. Since the war began, even those clearly involved in the October 7 massacre have not yet faced trial; they remain in custody as members of illegal armed groups awaiting trial.
“Who sets the proportions? Hamas sets the proportions. They issue demands; then we negotiate. Where we hold principled positions, they concede; elsewhere we compromise—but the tone is set by terrorists.”
Albats: The late Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar spent decades in Israeli prisons, learned Hebrew well, studied Israeli customs and society. Later he was exchanged and became one of the October 7, 2023 planners. Can you explain why for each hostage Israel releases 100 Palestinians?
Gurevich: You forgot to mention that Sinwar also endured brain tumor surgery while in prison. They gain a lot in prison, including education. Regarding exchange criteria, we even had a Shamgar commission to decide proportions. But it’s always a legally creative moment. Who sets the proportions? Hamas sets them; we negotiate. Sometimes we stand firm, other times we yield—but terrorists set the tone.
For example, in the Gilad Shalit deal, one Israeli soldier was exchanged for 1,027 Palestinians. Earlier there was the Jibril deal, huge numbers again. After the 2006 Lebanon war, live Palestinian prisoners (including life terms) were traded for bodies of Israeli soldiers. Then Shamgar commission said you cannot exchange living people for dead ones. In current talks, at one point Hamas demanded dead hostages in return for live terrorists—but Israel rejected that and maintained the principle. We are often accused of disproportionate exchanges—but who sets proportions? Terrorists. They place a value—often 1 life to 1,000, or in best cases 1:1000—and we bargain from there.
Sharp: The pattern of Israel making massively disproportionate exchanges dates back far. In 1971, one Fatah terrorist was exchanged for a kidnapped guard in northern Israel. In 1979, one soldier was exchanged for 76 terrorists—this was a breakthrough. Since then, Israel has repeatedly accepted humanitarian or political pressure to concede. Each time it was strategically mistaken in my view.
Behind the Scenes
Albats: I’d like to ask how the current deal was achieved. You, David, in one of our talks said you can’t simultaneously wage war in Gaza and fight for hostage release. Suddenly, when nothing seemed to work, things turned. From what I hear from Israeli and American sources, the turning moment was an Israeli strike on a Doha house where Hamas leaders were believed present—and that was the hook Trump or his people grabbed. Who pressured Hamas? What roles did Erdogan, Qatar, Egypt play? What do you know about the backroom?
Gurevich: Most we know from a New York Times report: the failed assassination attempt on Hamas leaders triggered the deal. That moment, Trump pressured Netanyahu. Simultaneously, Bibi apologized to the Emir of Qatar, putting pressure on Qatar.
Albats: What did Trump tell Netanyahu that made him back down? Netanyahu said diplomatic pressure forced Israel’s step.
Gurevich: Trump said to Netanyahu: “Enough.” Netanyahu understands Trump is the most popular politician in Israel. One post from Trump on Truth Social puts Netanyahu in an awkward spot. He cannot afford to contradict Trump. The best confirmation: Hamas responded to Trump’s ultimatum with “yes, but.” Netanyahu and his circle treated this as negative—but Trump said this was an affirmative response, that Hamas agreed to the deal. Netanyahu had no choice but to go along. That’s the reality.
Because what Israel saw that day, the world saw, and Netanyahu saw firsthand. When Whitcoff and Jared Kushner came to the Hostages Square, even leftists chanting there shouted, “Thank you, Trump.” They thanked Trump and jeered Netanyahu’s name. For them Trump was unquestioned authority.
Often people say Trump is a businessman. I insist that he is a developer — a very specific kind of business. In some way, the Middle East is exactly the world region where a New York developer’s skills yield stellar results. Nowhere else do they work as they do here. Because here, in the Middle East, someone can negotiate with Erdogan, and then openly answer a journalist asking “Will you provide F-35s to Erdogan?” by saying: we spoke with Erdogan, he must do a few favors, then we’ll help him. Neither Biden, Obama, Clinton, nor even Bush Jr. could adopt such a style. But Trump can—and it works in the Middle East like nowhere else. So much so that Biden, after Trump, reversed many policies globally—but not in the Middle East.
Hamas, as It Is
Albats: David, Mikhail said Hamas leaders initially responded “yes, but.” Who are these Hamas leaders? Those in Turkey? Those in Doha? Those in Gaza? Who negotiated?
Sharp: Hamas leadership is two-tiered. First, in Gaza—they are most influential during war. Despite 17 of the top 20 military/political leaders in Gaza being killed, those who remain—commonly considered to be Izzaddin al-Haddad and Raad Saad—are authoritative inside Gaza. They ultimately decide what to do. Foreign leadership has less clout; Hamas abroad now operates collectively. During the war, two main leaders—Ismail Haniyeh (political bureau head) and Saleh al-Aruri—were killed. Since then leadership is collective.
Attempts were made to hit this leadership in Doha via ballistic strikes—but intelligence miscalculated. Some strikes landed as planned, others not. These abroad leaders, often in Qatar or Turkey, move freely between them. Turkey is in a delicate position: Erdogan’s regime openly supports Hamas, does not call them terrorists but a liberation movement. Still, hosting those planning terror attacks is not politically comfortable, especially with U.S. ties. In the end, decisions came by consensus; Hamas faced pressure from both sides.
Albats: Who negotiated with Hamas? Erdogan or his people? Or Qatar? And how, with Israel controlling Gaza internally, did negotiations proceed?
“Hamas was pressured by Qatar and Turkey. Each has its own interests, apparently satisfied in part by the U.S.”
Sharp: Israel does not control internal Gaza negotiations. Israel does not obstruct messages from Gaza to Doha, on what the Hamas leadership, like Izzaddin al-Haddad, thinks. Negotiations were between Israel on one side, and Qatar, the U.S., and later Turkey on the other. Hamas heeded Turkey when, at some point, Erdogan likely received promises from Trump and entered the fray—his pressure on Hamas gained weight amid Israeli military pressure.
Hamas faced pressure from both Qatar and Turkey. Qatar, hit by the strike in Doha, panicked—its emir saw his world could be under threat—and realized it must give something to the U.S. The deal was structured. Netanyahu’s apology to Qatar was moderate: “We didn’t aim at Qatar, we aimed at Hamas, and regret the death of a Qatari security officer.” He did not say regret for hitting Hamas. But the convergence of interest matters. Many claim it was all Trump’s pressure—yet Israel was acting internally for months (since August) not only to militarily defeat Hamas but to force it to capitulate. When they announced Gaza city would be taken, they did not say they would occupy the entire sector—hinting hope for cooperation from Hamas. Earlier in summer Israel hoped for partial hostage exchange per a Whitcoff plan. Israel was working toward something like this long ago. Netanyahu hoped for a deal better than Trump’s plan. I thought that unrealistic—Hamas unlikely to surrender fully. Maybe I was mistaken. At least on paper, Hamas’s response was considered in line with cooperation, though they quickly said “we are not ready.” This paradox is key: Trump demands swift disarmament. Hamas leaders do not.
“More or less money for Hamas doesn’t matter—the construction of tunnels, military production, arms smuggling would not be harmed by funding changes. Iran is primarily responsible for weapon supply, rockets, arms production in Gaza.”
Albats: If the IDF leaves the sector, who will disarm Hamas?
Sharp: A very important question. Israel for many political, psychological, and other reasons refused to entirely occupy Gaza even temporarily. If Israel declines full occupation, then you face either endless special ops or a political process to disarm Hamas. Many think that is utopian or unlikely. But the core is: Hamas must be convinced disarmament is worse than alternative. The only alternative is full occupation. If that is not threatened, Hamas is resilient—resistant to Turkish and Qatari pressure.
I don’t know what promises were made by Turkey and Qatar to Trump. But I fear in practice the disarmament will be delayed. Hamas may surrender some weapons superficially. Israel cannot leave Hamas’s armed wing next door after October 7. If Hamas retains military potential, it could rebuild automatically.
Albats: But if Qatar and Turkey stop arms supplies, how would Hamas remilitarize?
Sharp: Qatar and Turkey never supplied weapons. Iran did so via smuggling channels. Iran also provided financing. Qatar’s funds were only a fraction of Hamas’ budget. But the crucial thing for Hamas was war preparedness. No matter how much money, tunnel building, weapons smuggling, arms production—all remained intact. These were managed by Iran.
Albats: Will Iran now cease weapons supply to Gaza?
Sharp: No, obviously not. Only IDF action or a robust enforcement mechanism (unlikely) could halt arms smuggling. The best guarantee to curb contraband is controlling the border between Egypt and Gaza. If that border is controlled, underground smuggling becomes physically impossible. Overland smuggling is very hard; by air via drones is possible but manageable. If the border remains under Hamas control, smuggling will persist—at least steadily.
Relying on International Forces…
Albats: Given General Sisi’s role in current negotiations, can we hope Egypt will shut the border with Israel?
Sharp: One can’t hope. Even when al-Sisi signaled desire, he failed. Mubarak pretended to want it; in truth he had his own agenda. Under the Muslim Brotherhood it was worse. We can rely only on ourselves or fully reliable mechanisms. Without clear American involvement and Israeli intelligence, it won’t work.
Gurevich: Currently 600 aid trucks per day enter Gaza. Inspecting all is massive work. Already, weapons smuggling has been found. Thus, when 600 trucks run daily, fighting smuggling will be extremely difficult.
Just two words about negotiations: Americans, perhaps for the first time in decades, spoke directly with terrorists—not only over hostage exchange, but also on Gaza’s future.
Albats: Was it Whitcoff, Kushner, or others?
Gurevich: Whitcoff, Kushner, and Adam Boehler (hostage negotiator). Trump openly said: “We talked with Hamas, we reached agreement with Hamas.” Under Biden such a stance would be unthinkable—Israel would protest, and it contradicts U.S. policy.
Albats: Bottom line: will war at least temporarily end? Or is it an illusion?
Gurevich: We need first define when “war began.” Trump says he ended a three-thousand-year conflict. We talk from Israel’s founding onward. This two-year war is “over.” But what next? We hope for years of peace and that reason will prevail. The peace plan gives a window for normalization, for more cooperation with Saudi Arabia and others. We must seize that window.
Sharp: I don’t believe war has ended. A war between Israel and Hamas has existed since 1987. Gaza combat may be paused for some time. But if Hamas disarmament is slowed, nothing good awaits us. I’m pessimistic. The Middle East will not be resolved with one stroke. But the hostage release is a significant step. Some agreements and normalization are bonuses. Yet Hamas still sits at our doorstep; October 7 showed what can happen if threats are ignored.
Joint Work
Albats: Mikhail, commentators already say Gulf states must participate in Gaza’s reconstruction. Huge funds are needed. But they will invest only if war won’t restart. Can Arab states tie Hamas’ hands so their money isn’t wasted?
Gurevich: It depends on the state. Qatar has strengthened Hamas’s rule to protect its investments. All Gulf states must align interests. That’s massive. Qatar until recently was a pariah; UAE, Bahrain, Egypt cut ties. For them to unite required negotiation—now helped by Trump. Will this alliance last beyond Trump’s tenure? Unknown. But we see the Middle East returning under a U.S. umbrella, after years of chaos. Rebuilding Gaza might become a unifying project across Arab states and Israel. Already many military meetings are happening for joint exercises. Nothing unites more or gives hope than shared projects.
Albats: What role will the Palestinian Authority have? CBS showed a firm exchange between Trump and Mahmoud Abbas, 88-year-old PA leader. Who will lead Gaza?
Gurevich: Many candidates exist. Who replaces Abbas on Gaza and the West Bank is huge question. He promises reforms per the Trump peace plan to reinstate PA governance. What reforms? The plan doesn’t specify. The plan’s vagueness makes signing easier but future details contentious. Can PA manage? Strange situation: A leader who cooperates with Israel loses support (as Abbas did). If he doesn’t, like Sinwar, he becomes targeted by Israeli special services. Who can break this vicious cycle? Arafat managed temporarily—then failed. Can someone else? Unknown.
“Adopt a postwar budget with huge reconstruction expenses—it won’t be popular. Better call elections.”
Albats: My contacts in Israel say elections are inevitable post-war. It seems Trump understands that—judging by his appeal to President Herzog to “pardon” Netanyahu, who is under trial. What do you think?
Gurevich: Elections are inevitable for two reasons. First, by law they must happen by November 2026. Only four governments in Israel’s history have lasted full terms. Holding elections in October next year (third anniversary of October 7) is bad connotation for a prime minister. A postwar budget with massive reconstruction costs will be unpopular. Better elections so a new coalition takes on the budget. Netanyahu needs fewer votes to retain power than opposition. I expect elections soon. As to whether Netanyahu will be jailed after leaving office, I favor amnesty in exchange for stepping down. Not sure he faces a real sentence—but this is an ethical issue. In any case, there will be elections, and those betting Netanyahu will lose may overestimate. He bets on U.S. presidents, and both times he backed Trump, he won. His position is strong; Trump’s visit and hostage releases boost his domestic standing.
Did Israel Win or Lose?
Albats: The historian Niall Ferguson compared Israel’s current position to Bismarck’s Germany in the late 19th century: Germany unified its principalities and showed Europe it could defend itself by force. Ferguson says Netanyahu, “the wartime prime minister,” did the same now. On one hand, Israel showed the region it can fight all comers. On the other, its legitimacy is questioned, and a wave of antisemitism sweeps the world. What do you say?
“Israel’s actions added us legitimacy and restored the strength we need to survive in the Middle East. The question is: where do we seek legitimacy? Regionally we’re fine; in Europe and the West is a major problem.”
Gurevich: I disagree with calling Netanyahu “the wartime prime minister.” He didn’t choose this war. If he had the choice, he wouldn’t have picked it. In years past, despite promises to defeat Hamas, he never took actual steps to annihilate it. Netanyahu is a politician who always seeks superposition—a position that leaves room for retreat, reallocation, transition. He wasn’t even ready to conclude the war; it was largely Trump’s pressure that moved him.
As for legitimacy: it depends where you look. In the Middle East, they say: “You either dine or are eaten”—either you’re at the table or you’re on the menu. In that sense, Israel’s actions restored legitimacy and strength in the region. If we seek legitimacy only regionally, fine—but in Europe and the West we have a huge problem now. Protests and criticism that didn’t exist before now rage. That is a massive challenge; we’ve created big problems for our diaspora (e.g. in America). Dealing with that needs work.
Honestly, to address this, new people must enter Israeli politics. The realization of what happened will take 2–3 years. Maybe not this election, but the next one should bring in fresh forces who will approach Israel’s future differently, having internalized what happened over these two years.