Albats: Andrey, in a recent column for NT titled “A Paper Tiger Flying to Hell”, you wrote: “The Russian population has developed an image of the future. It’s called ‘When Everything Ends.’” What does that hope for the future express?
Kolesnikov: These are statements by people in various focus groups the sociologists tell me about. But one also hears them in everyday conversations: “when this crap ends,” “after all this ends, maybe we’ll live again somehow.” That means: we will live differently, we will live better; we won’t carry the moral burden that — even if one tries to abstract from it — still exists. Even for people who try not to assume any responsibility (which is the majority): what do we have to do with this? We didn’t start it, we don’t carry it out, we don’t participate in it, we’re just suffering, inflation is caused by it — still, it is a burden. In the West, people say we are to blame for something. And from all that one wants to get free.
There is exhaustion from what is happening. It shows up in large poll numbers from various sociological services. More people want peace. Because they’re tired. Because it’s been three and a half years: in January the duration of the “Special Military Operation” will equal that of the Great Patriotic War — a metaphorical, symbolic marker. Our ancestors, with whom we are constantly compared — we supposedly continue them, we defeated the main enemy. To what conclusion do we come? We must endure further? The state says yes — because we continue to be attacked. Right now there is every effort to provoke a threat from Europe. Probably that is meant to justify that the SVO drags on, doesn’t end, that there are economic consequences, which the authorities already acknowledge. And yet the authorities say openly — you must. Peskov says: we are more consolidated than ever, people are willing to endure, to “tighten belts” — he didn’t use that wording, but that was what he implied. Siluanov, the finance minister, says: Russia’s allies are the army, the navy, and stable finances. For what do you need stable finances? To fund the army and the navy and the military-industrial complex, naturally. Immediately the VAT is raised, which had been promised would not be raised, but in the name of a stable tax system it was increased. The threshold at which businesses pay that VAT was lowered — from 60 million to 10 million. Accordingly, people must understand what they’re paying for. This is not hidden — it's already a source of pride: yes, we are spending money for military aims. Everyone must understand and support it.
VAT, inflation, and everything
Albats: VAT is increased by 2%. How much will prices rise? Also 2%, or cumulatively more?
Kolesnikov: I haven’t seen precise calculations; perhaps none exist, or those used by the Ministry of Finance are not very precise because reality always adjusts things. Government economists, including Nabiullina (Chair of the Central Bank), say the effect will be one-time. Yes, there will be inflation, a shock, but after that it will somehow dissolve into the air. I don’t know why it would dissolve if it's a constant inflation-generating factor. There are other factors too. Military spending does not go away. Government expenditures in general provoke inflation. Why should it vanish or become negligible? Putin once boasted that average inflation “across the board” fell from 8.8% to 8.1% — big improvements, from his perspective. From the people's point of view, I fear it doesn't feel like that.
Albats: According to amendments to the budget submitted to the Duma by the Finance Ministry, Russia’s 2025 budget deficit will amount to 2.6% of GDP (vs. 1.7% projected). Revenues are set to shrink through cuts to non-oil/gas sources. At the same time, a third of all revenues will go toward what they call “national defense.” If one adds secret services, some estimate 41% will go to all of these. What’s the reaction? Do people realize real money is being taken from their pockets?
“It’s astonishing how vast were the state’s funds, as it turns out. Had they been spent—for example—on healthcare, we might now have world-class medical care.”
Kolesnikov: It's unclear, because the masses stay silent. This is no democracy of the taxpayer: we pay taxes and you should serve us, or at least explain where the money goes. And in fact the government does explain — “for military purposes,” because we are in an existential battle with the West; it’s long, costly; you must understand and tighten belts. In other words, as we said, this is already being broadcast openly. What is surprising is how enormous the sums the state had turned out to be. If spent on healthcare, say, we might have the best health system in the world. Trillions of rubles, dollars, etc. The official defense budget plus security, secret expenses have grown: first 15%, then 20%, now their share has approached 30%. One must realize that secret expenses don't go to healthcare or education. On top of that, benefits and payments to families of participants in the SVO and the participants themselves, preferential treatment at work, preferential admission to universities. A 10% free quota for children of SVO participants. Universities get funds to cover that. And still other such costs. 41% might even be optimistic. And direct payments to military factories, the defense complex. Depending on how one counts military spending, you might reach 70%.
People, I believe, don’t so much refuse to understand as push these questions away. They abstract themselves from it. There’s now a sense that even those who suffer from this war, burned from the inside by horror and conscience and everything in the world — these three and a half years have dried everything out. I hear from many acquaintances: “You know, I unsubscribed from several Telegram channels, I just can’t. I can’t follow it anymore.”
Kolesnikov: Here there’s a cocktail in which it’s hard to discern the ingredients. By the way, 25 million (views) — that’s YouTube; many in Russia watching with VPN installed. It’s evident that increasing numbers want to hear someone who was an authority to them. Looking at Levada Center polls since 1992, Pugacheva was always among the top ten most influential women, even when she no longer sang.
“There is a convention of silence, a convention of distancing oneself from what is happening: ‘we don’t discuss this.’ We force ourselves not to know. That is dangerous.”
Albats: Russian propagandists simply smeared her for greeting some Ukrainians she saw by the Baltic Sea, answering them “дякую” (Ukrainian “thank you”).
Kolesnikov: That was a human action, as many interviews are — and thanks to Gordeeva for bringing her into that conversation. So everyone exploded. She is a very authoritative person, with moral weight. They said Brezhnev was a small politician of Pugacheva’s era—now we can say the same about modern figures because Pugacheva’s era has returned through a single interview. That’s why everyone got stirred.
Albats: You and I remember the Afghan war. At first the reaction was calm — Afghanistan was far away. Then “Cargo 200” (death coffins) came, burials. Gradually opposition to the war and to veterans arose. Now losses are incomparably larger. Do people in Russia know that? Or don’t they respond?
Kolesnikov: There is a convention of silence or distancing — “we don’t discuss it.” We force ourselves not to know. Partly that’s dangerous, because losses are perhaps the most sensitive matter for the authorities. One of the most sensitive. To discuss them is impossible in any digital form or otherwise. Although information flows in a modern society — even an authoritarian or semi-totalitarian one — faster than the Soviet Union, still there is a sense that during the Afghan war we somewhat knew things. Not that we actively discussed them, but private intrusion was less intense than now. The fear of drafted boys was known. The ten years passed, a generation essentially passed through it not fully knowing the “why.” Taliban are now invited to economic forums. Strange retrospect.
“Everything sinks in silent agreement that we somehow must endure this, survive it, and sooner this would all just end. Meanwhile, our boys are dying.”
The convention of silence holds both regarding the SVO as a whole and the fact that there are heavy casualties. Even demographers lack full data to analyze mortality structure now. How analyze it when huge amounts of data drop out? They are secret; statistics are secreted. Demographers and economists struggle. Yet by indirect signs they manage. I think everything sinks into that silent agreement that we should endure, survive — because our boys are dying. In major surveys when sociologists ask why people favor peace negotiations, the first reason is: we lose so many people. A perfectly normal human judgment. But the human judgment is not likely to belong to certain strata of higher political atmosphere.
Albats: So you believe there is a conspiracy of silence or tacit empathy—not that Putin invented a brilliant scheme where war is waged by mercenaries in Ukraine instead of the army? Do you believe that the drowning of death in money played a role?
Kolesnikov: Yes, it helps self-justification: I don’t pay attention because it’s mostly prisoners, contract soldiers, professionals. It becomes an auto-training. I think many engage in it. Especially on television, no one will say what the magnitude of losses is — only victories. “Over there” serve heroes and patriotically minded youth who defend the homeland so the enemy doesn’t reach Siberia. Literally.
Albats: That is, war in someone else’s territory, as Stalinist propagandists used to say?
Kolesnikov: The leitmotif of Stalinist “liberation of our brothers,” as they “liberated” Western Belarus and Western Ukraine — we came, took back what was ours — that same logic underlay the explanation of the Special Operation. But there are mobilized people: a great mass has been there for three years. Not always professional soldiers, sometimes people with military experience, not always young. Some are mature, they should be tending gardens, raising grandchildren, not running with rifles in trenches. Yet they remain there. The women’s protest was crushed at root.
Albats: You mean wives of mobilized men?
Kolesnikov: Yes, wives of mobilized who began organizing. When it became noticeable, it was crushed. And we see habituation: earlier they said — maybe we will be released in spring... Now attitudes are different. People stop indulging hope, especially after Trump, in effect, realized he can’t fix the problem by a swoop.
The “Celebration That Never Ends”
Albats: In your column you write that in Moscow they are again replacing curbstones [i.e. sidewalks]. In that sense, nothing has changed in Moscow?
“The sense is that in parks there are many more people with dogs and much fewer with strollers. Some emotional fracture or change in the age structure of the population.”
Kolesnikov: Moscow is a celebration that is always with you. Endless processions, closures of the Garden Ring, moto-bike rides, celebration of the 1980 Olympics — a cargo cult. We can’t compete in meaningful events, so we recall old ones. Instead of real airplanes we’ll worship straw and stick airplanes. Instead of new triumphs, we reminisce past ones. A colleague living on the Garden Ring counted that in summer the Ring was closed 12–13 times over weekends for such holidays. People enjoy such attention to leisure. But this attention to leisure shows that, alongside emotional mobilization ("you must tighten your belts, the enemy is at the gate, nothing ends") there is emotional demobilization — we don’t force you to go fight, you can live a “normal” life. Here are recruitment points, here are posters, even in the metro. But you can live your life. Moscow is 20% of total revenues of all regions and 20% of their expenses. It’s a wildly rich city. I can’t generalize from my own observation, but I feel more people walk in parks with dogs and fewer with strollers. Some emotional fracture, or a change in age structure. Maybe children are fewer, or young men are fewer. Dogs are also emotional surrogates. People hold 2–3 dogs. In Moscow restaurants and cafés in the center one sees mostly women; young men are relatively scarce. Are they all recruited? Or have they left? That is impression, not demographic evidence — but many share it.
Albats: And in Moscow they especially don’t recruit for the Ukraine war — though a new call-up has begun and quotas seem higher than last year.
Kolesnikov: Moscow is huge, densely populated; absolute numbers seem smaller than provinces. Maybe proportions similar. Large potential for recruitment. I hear from various parents stories that the electronic register system doesn’t differentiate boys with deferrals or exemptions. In the register, a young man aged 18-30 is just a male of that age. In the metro, facial recognition might catch him; then he explains: “I came from Yekaterinburg to visit friends, but I have an exemption because I work as an IT guy.” True story.
Albats: And does that work? Do they let him go?
Kolesnikov: In that case he was spared — parents and his company intervened, credit to them. Friends rallied. He defended himself somehow. But there are people who cannot defend themselves. People with illnesses get drafted anyway; as though it matters not. They are not treated as people but as tools of warfare. This raises problems, especially in Moscow, because the digital authoritarianism is most developed here. People are transparent; seen everywhere. So I don’t think Moscow or Petersburg differ much from provinces.
The Blackout Factor
Albats: How informed are people, for instance, about Ukrainian airstrikes on a power plant in Belgorod, leaving the city without electricity or hot water? That Zelensky threatened a blackout in Moscow. Do people know or react?
Kolesnikov: I think people are highly informed — Telegram is still unblocked. Also there are non-blocked outlets like RBC or Kommersant, whose news feeds are similar to those of blocked outlets. Many things not disclosed, but what Zelensky says is present. Translations of WSJ and NYT appear. So there is no information vacuum. If you want info, even without VPN, you can get it. The question is, do you want it? Do you want to think about what you read? Many lose the desire to evaluate, follow, think, empathize.
Albats: Do people connect unpleasant developments to if Russia had not started the SVO, this wouldn’t happen?
Kolesnikov: A normal, decently educated person can draw logical connection. But many refuse that reasoning for themselves.
Where Do You Go From a Submarine?
Albats: You wrote about fear in people due to constant reports of arrests, long sentences. NT reported that in recent months 45 teens were jailed for extremism. Kommersant reports the former deputy governor of Sverdlovsk Oleg Chemezov was detained based on testimony from a former minister. It’s clear repression targets two categories: officials (especially in infrastructure, in the rear services) and open war opponents. How is the nomenklatura (bureaucracy) perceiving their risks? It was predicted that repression would first come for “our own,” officials. How do they react?
Kolesnikov: I think they respond with more discipline, more adherence to the general line, more expressed loyalty, fearful showing of dutiful service. Those with something to hide begin thinking the wave is serious. But you see that these people are wealthy, have combination of capital and bureaucratic leverage. Everyone is corrupt; but why are some taken and others spared? Others fear “will they come for me next?” within the security apparatus or by business rivals. I believe such people will serve the regime faithfully till the end — because loyalty is their only protection. They show they’ll work 24/7. Where do they go when the submarine surfaces? They lived under those rules a long time; a lot of money is in the system; we are rich; system seems to have failed — rules changed due to the SVO. What to do? Jump out the window.
Albats: We see a lot of people are jumping out windows — especially in India.
Kolesnikov: Yes, there was a case of both arrest and window exit. It’s rather gothic.
Albats: A colleague teaching recently told me people felt fear in summer, but by end of summer overcame it.
Kolesnikov: Among ordinary people, I don’t think they are paralyzed by fear. Maybe the elites are. Ordinary people live and adapt to circumstances. That is how average people respond to external hardships. YouTube is blocked? You go to another service. WhatsApp voice calls blocked? Use another messaging method. Adaptation, not protest — understandable in harsh repression. Not everyone demands political freedoms. I don’t delegitimize the army; I keep silent, that’s normal. That’s the “ordinary citizen” stance.
Neighbors in the Near Abroad
Albats: In Moldova, in elections this Sunday, a pro-European party won, aiming for EU integration; the pro-Russian Dodon party got half as many votes. Lots was written about Russian special services buying people, working via the Moldovan diaspora, paying money — but it failed. Is there a reaction?
Kolesnikov: The nomenklatura tracks and discusses such events closely — that’s their work, their life, their milieu. The average citizen probably knows little and cares less — about top-level affairs or former Soviet states. More attention was paid to Azerbaijan, heavily discussed by z bloggers. On xenophobic bases it’s easier to engage people — “bad Azerbaijanis,” “bad Armenians.” Perhaps people in Moscow less about it but political types follow.
Albats: Fewer Azerbaijanis in Moscow now? Many ran markets.
Kolesnikov: Hard to judge. Maybe a decline, but small. I don’t believe it’s big.
Albats: You mentioned news feeds. People write that Trump “woke up” after 9 months, realized Putin misled him, reversed course 180°. According to General Kellogg, Trump allowed long-range missile use against central Russia, Moscow, St. Petersburg. What do people write about these threats?
Kolesnikov: I think Putin still needs Trump; Trump doesn’t want a clash with Putin. So far rhetoric is cautious: “We hope for partnership, a more rational administration.” Lavrov continues this. Peskov said that if Tomahawks are used, we must know who directs them — Ukraine or the U.S. A hint that it would be seen as act of war. That’s awful. That hybrid/pseudo-war with drones aimed at Europe — provoking bureaucracy and European public opinion. Europe is uneasy when drones fly. Europe doesn’t really want to respond — it knows war between NATO and Russia is possible. That’s a different story.
Calculation or Foolishness?
Albats: Europeans surely understand that drones, planes, cyberattacks are serious — war in Ukraine is not distant; war comes to them. What is the point of provoking them?
Kolesnikov: Two possible answers. One: they expected European public outrage to pressure governments to push Ukraine to concessions. But the reverse is happening — governments intensify support for Ukraine. If that backfire was not anticipated, then second version: this is sheer folly. Irresponsible, leading to very grave outcomes, possibly full war. A normal person asks: why do this? Isn’t what’s already happening enough? Sociologists are read in the Kremlin. People are tired. Why provoke escalation?
Albats: Their actions sometimes seem absurd — e.g. Foreign Minister Lavrov showed up in Anchorage in a T-shirt saying “USSR.” But sometimes it becomes terrifying — especially for those of us who have loved ones in Moscow or Russia. Yet people continue to watch political shows on YouTube.
“Moscow is now one of the geographic points with the highest support for the SVO. Wealthy people, clearly, don’t want change; they feel comfortable in harmony with power whatever that power does.”
Kolesnikov: Thankfully, there are people who remain engaged, in different parts of the country. Moscow has shifted ideologically. It was once considered very democratic, liberal — voters often picked liberal politicians. Now Moscow is among the places where the SVO is most supported. The affluent, especially, don’t wish change; they feel fine in accord with power. Moscow is kind of closing in on itself, becoming hardened and living a private life, not a political one.
Albats: My last question: about the dramatic funeral of TV propagandist Tigran Keosayan — live broadcast, representatives from the Foreign Ministry, presidential administration, famous actors, directors, media figures, wreaths from the president and the prime minister, heavy security. Why such a guard wall at a funeral? Why live on TV? Why public display of what is essentially a private event?
Kolesnikov: When celebrities die, not only acquaintances attend but strangers too — people who saw them on TV come to take part. Keosayan is a television person. The point is, he can be portrayed as a victim of “our confrontation with the West,” as a Russian hero in the propaganda front. They bury him as a hero. That’s two sides of the story of a prominent propagandist.
* Yevgenia Albats and Andrey Kolesnikov, as well as the Levada Center, have been designated “foreign agents” in the Russian Federation.
** WhatsApp belongs to Meta, a company recognized in the Russian Federation as an extremist organization and banned on the territory of the country.
Photo: Carnegie Politika.