Yevgenia Albats: Whether it’s the dismissal or voluntary resignation of longtime Putin associate Dmitry Kozak (from the Saint Petersburg days), who was deputy head of the administration and publicly opposed the war; the designation of pro-Z blogger Roman Alekhin as a “foreign agent”; successive unexplained deaths; intensifying bombings of Ukrainian cities after Putin’s meeting with Trump in Alaska—
All this gives the impression of a policy under Putin that is multivector, to put it politely, and utterly mad, if one calls things by their name. Trying to discern, predict, or extract any coherent strategy from what’s happening in Moscow is becoming ever harder. Are you able to do it?
Abbas Gallyamov: No. I simply do not despair over this. The absence of strategy and the wholesale substitution of strategy by tactics I view as a fairly natural phenomenon. Putin’s capabilities don’t match his desires. And he isn’t used to denying himself anything. He’s been fully omnipotent for 25 years. In other words, he’s unaccustomed to any constraints. Here, things don’t work out—it’s as if a scythe has met a stone. So he understandably sometimes flies into a rage.
Sometimes, when he calms down, he tries to act a bit more rationally, but in the end everything still boils down to attempts to achieve what cannot be achieved, from left or right, by fair means or foul. The result is precisely this feeling of collapse. On one hand, he does not want to fully adopt the course hawks propose—complete militarization of the economy; full militarization of society; the abandonment of the SVO doctrine (Special Military Operation) and a return to a Great Patriotic War doctrine: the enemy is at the gate, everything for the front, everything for victory. As Prigozhin once said, the civilian economy must be fully reoriented to produce for the front. Alaudin recently said — let’s mobilize a million people into the army and there will be no problems.
Putin doesn’t go for those steps. He still tries to preserve the economy in at least a minimal market form, although the State is already too big from that point of view; and Belousov, the defense minister (sic — the text actually says “minister of defense,” but I believe they mean economic strategist), says a Gosplan is needed.
Albats: Belousov was formerly an economic adviser to Putin.
Gallyamov: Yes, a kind of economic strategist. He is an advocate of state ownership of the economy, of absolute state regulation, like in the Soviet Union. But Putin does none of that, because he overall understands this is a path leading to nowhere. He well remembers how the Soviet economy collapsed—and with it, the Soviet Union. So he doesn’t truly believe it’s a sustainable structure—even if it is aesthetically appealing to him.
Yet he also does not want to stop the war. Even though sanctions and war push the economy downward—and this is already said even by members of the government. Why does this happen? Because he has no strategy. He lives day to day. That is, every day he expects the Ukrainian front to collapse; that Ukraine cannot hold. They expected the summer offensive to lead to a final capture of Donbass. But it didn’t happen. So they hope maybe now it will.
He proceeds from the principle: no matter what problems we have, Ukraine has more problems. Ukraine clings on thanks to Western aid; so let’s scare Europe more, so it thinks of its own security rather than Ukraine. For Europeans, the idea of allowing Putin to take Donbass seems too much. But now I might really scare them thoroughly!
On many fronts they are probing the ground. It’s possible that in fact preparations are underway for an attack, but maybe they’re just applying pressure hoping Europeans will stop backing Ukraine.
Albats: Do you mean the drones that struck Poland, or Russian planes over Estonia and Romania?
Gallyamov: And cyberattacks on European airports. They are probing many directions. But here, too, there is no strategy. It is not impossible that actual attacks are being prepared; after 2022 we cannot exclude that sadly. But maybe he is simply applying pressure hoping Europe will back away from supporting Ukraine—and that even Trump can’t do anything about it.
Betting on a Split
Albats: We’ll talk about this more soon, but now I want to ask you to comment on the latest events. Dmitry Kozak, at the fateful session of the Security Council on the eve of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, spoke out against war. He said diplomacy had not been exhausted; that speech was cut short. But as far as I know, two other people at the time also thought an invasion should not be rushed: Nikolai Patrushev (then Secretary of the Security Council) and Naryshkin, head of foreign intelligence. It was written that Kozak had been sidelined for years and himself tendered a resignation. On the other hand, Alexei Venediktov noted that in Putin’s decree on Kozak’s dismissal there's no mention of his acting of his own volition—i.e. Putin was unhappy he had taken that decision himself. What do you think?
Gallyamov: I’d prefer to wait for the decision about Kozak’s fate. The thing is, Interfax, which can now be called a Kremlin press-office affiliate, reported that two options are being considered: transition to business or being appointed full plenipotentiary in the Northwest Federal District. These are very different. If Kozak exits to business, then the question of why Putin keeps a person who opposed the war near him falls away.
But if Kozak becomes a plenipotentiary (which is not lower in status than his former deputy role—and maybe even more powerful in function now), that’s different. As plenipotentiary he would not be a zero. No governor would dare disobey Kozak’s orders. That involves a lot of coordination, including in security appointments, across the district. And that district includes St. Petersburg—no walkover.
That would be a serious indicator that Putin still wants Kozak near him in the system. I would personally take that as a sign Putin does not rule out needing a sharp turn in direction compared to what is going on now. And Kozak would be the person to carry that turn out. If one day it becomes necessary to yield to Trump, to cease the war, to negotiate lifting sanctions (i.e. normalization), it might be necessary to bring the Z (pro-war) camp under very tight control—and Kozak is ideal for that. First, by conviction he doesn’t like them. Second, he is functional, able to bring anyone to heel. You could appoint him prosecutor general or head of the presidential administration and not worry that internal patriotic camp will begin stirring against you—he’ll quickly quell them.
But if Kozak leaves state service entirely, I will interpret that as evidence Putin has closed that possibility for himself—that he sees only escalation ahead.
Albats: In recent days the media writes that Moscow is preparing a kind of coup in Moldova through electoral districts, working via the Moldovan diaspora. Kozak was entrusted with Moldova. Is that so?
Gallyamov: Since 2022 Kozak hasn’t done that. Now a new office was created from the two that used to report to Kozak. It is headed by Chaika, son of the former prosecutor general, and it now is under Kirienko's oversight. This new office will oversee both the CIS and political operations among all the “Putin-fervent” actors in Europe—or maybe globally. Putin has an intent to exploit protest sentiment and the rise of right-wing parties in Western countries.
Returning to Moldova: beyond Chaika and Kirienko, the FSB is very active. The administration and the chekists are shaking the situation there, pumping in huge resources. It is part of a strategy (and here, one must admit, there is a strategy) for Putin to create as many problems for the West outside Ukraine as possible—so that in the end the West might decide it’s better to abandon Ukraine than contend with internal destabilization.
Trump Pressures Europe
Albats: Economists in Western universities (such as Harvard’s Oleg Itskhoki or the Dean of the London Business School Sergey Guriev) argue that the only sanctions that could seriously hamper Putin’s ability to wage war are a near-embargo on Russian oil. Trump recently reiterated his efforts to push down oil prices and said that once it falls, Putin’s resources will vanish. He’s demanding Europe stop buying oil from Putin. We know full well that all EU members will never agree to that. What’s your take?
Gallyamov: First, Trump is trying to get them to support that. Second, Putin is pushing them that way. Escalation on the border with Poland and the Baltic states may push Europeans to do as Trump asks. Also, there’s the hybrid scenario: either the Europeans and Americans impose the embargo (in which case the Russian economy collapses), or they don’t (in which case Russia is more comfortable).
Yes, simultaneously Trump has become more active in Venezuela, in the Middle East, with respect to Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—trying to normalize things there so that Iranian and Venezuelan oil can flood markets, compensating for the drop in Russian supply. Oil and gas are not the only levers.
I think one reason he wants to normalize the Middle East is precisely to facilitate this shift: if Middle Eastern and Venezuelan oil supply increases, the West can impose harsher sanctions on Russia without triggering global oil shocks.
But it’s not just about money. Russia faces not only macroeconomic problems but also technological and production ones. Today, because of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian refineries, 17–20 % of Russian refining capacity is idle. I recently spoke with a petroleum engineer—on the tech side, this is a small part of the problem. The real issue is that there will soon be no place to store oil. You can’t export it, because Ukraine bombs not just refineries, but oil export terminals in ports. Transneft is already encountering issues: there is nowhere to send the extracted oil.
Soon oil producers will need to shut wells down. A shut well is virtually destroyed; reopening is so expensive that drilling a new one is easier. This is a serious technological problem. So when talking about sanctions, one must consider not only macroeconomics, not only how much money Putin has, but also degradation in specific sectors. Refineries need repair; but under sanctions you can’t import parts easily.
What used to be fixed in days now takes weeks; you can’t just buy a part and get it flown in immediately and installed. You resort to local improvisation, via Turkey, China, or transshipment networks, and pay triple. Meanwhile oil is pumped daily; it must go somewhere.
Transneft recently stated that they may soon appeal to producers to reduce supply volumes.
What About NATO?
Albats: In Europe voices already claim there is no diplomatic solution in the Ukrainian conflict; that Europe must face war with Russia. Don’t you think that after the violation of Polish, Estonian, and Romanian airspace, NATO has in effect ceased to exist—since Article 5 says an attack on one member is an attack on all, and that didn’t play out?
Gallyamov: Not yet—but that’s an exaggeration. There was no attack in the sense of bombing, shelling, death or destruction. These were provocations: airspace violations, then exit. Perhaps there is a case that those are not attacks. So I wouldn’t be quick to bury NATO.
Yet we see they are indeed reluctant to respond. Perhaps there is not only fear but an unwillingness to escalate.
Also perhaps a strategic bet: with a shark (Russia), you prefer not to wrestle in the sea—you try to pull it aboard with a hook and then chop off fins and tail. Why enter where Putin is strongest when economically we manage to compete well? The narrative that “sanctions help us” is no longer claimed, even by the most hardcore patriots in Russia.
We hear what economists and officials say at, e.g., the St. Petersburg Economic Forum and the Far East Economic Forum: “recession,” “the new ’90s”—these are no longer rhetorical extremes. The government is already devising rescue plans for metallurgy. More minor sectors, like coal and forestry, have been in rescue mode for months. Now the metallurgical sector is feeling it. Fuel shortages in 20 regions are growing. So sanctions are a rational decision.
Albats: Economists Sergey Aleksashenko and Vladislav Inozemtsev would likely argue otherwise—that the Russian economy is doing quite fine.
Gallyamov: As far as I understand, they believe there won't be a sudden collapse tomorrow. I don’t argue with that. But one should consider technological degradation in key sectors. Russia’s defense industry is struggling, using North Korean munitions, not domestic ones. Also, Putin’s goal is not to take Donbass and die doing so; there is a point of degradation beyond which you no longer can climb out. The Russian economy is declining qualitatively. While the rest of the world advances (AI, innovation), Russia slides downward. After some threshold, you simply can’t resurface.
Putin’s need is to continue reigning. I don’t know how long he intends to live—maybe to 150—but it’s not guaranteed. So in 5–10 years one may need to pass power (to daughter, son, Dumin—or someone else). The moment of transfer must be handled well. You need resources. If by that time the economy is fully dead—then collapse is inevitable. Even if it happens after Putin’s death, he cares about legacy. The last thing he wants is for the regime to be dismantled immediately after he is interred. As we know from Soviet history, what follows is destalinization.
Also there are heirs; their future must be considered. You cannot drive degradation so low that there is no recovery. So resource constraints exist—even if formally the economy has not died yet.
Albats: In Moscow economists think a decision will be found by cutting social programs and public spending. To that end, Putin blocked YouTube, restricted access to opposition media abroad, and is applying repression. Perhaps Putin does consider fully closing the country?
Gallyamov: No, he doesn’t exclude it—but he’s not in a hurry. I repeat: he likes the appearance of Soviet experience. He could have nationalized the economy years ago and resurrected Gosplan, but so far hasn’t. Even creeping nationalization through the prosecutor’s office is largely symbolic. Formally private assets are taken and handed to the State; but what happens next is opaque.
These enterprises are given to managers affiliated with Rotenbergs (in chemicals) or Kovaltchuks (in grain trading). They still operate like private entities in reality. That is, he doesn’t truly believe in state economy. He likes political statism—but economically he remains a liberal (he once supported liberal reforms).
Thus he moves toward full closure only reluctantly, only as the sense grows that if he fails to tighten the screws now, political unrest will begin. Some promote total closure—Sechin, Patrushev, Belousov: all for the front, all for victory. Tighten politics, reprisals even against “our own” — e.g. Roman Alekhin, Sergey Markov. Hawks propose such direction. But movement is gradual and without much enthusiasm.
Mysterious Deaths
Albats: We see that the YouTube blockade and the law penalizing “extremist” info-search are working: our subscribers are rapidly unsubscribing; viewership in Russia has dropped several times over. It’s apparent people are frightened. We see reports of mysterious deaths of nomenklatura figures and top managers. Do you think these are the tentacles of the Cheka—or are we exaggerating their significance?
Gallyamov: In some cases they obviously are political—like the case of Starovoit. I recall that even before Markov was labeled a foreign agent, he impulsively claimed it was murder, not suicide: that high officials cut ends. He thereby signaled, in effect, Rotenbergs. Soon after, he was classified a foreign agent.
Overall, sometimes it's political; other times purely business — redistributing flows—when one must convince someone to give something they won’t. After the war began, this process has decentralized. Decisions to eliminate someone now can be made at lower levels. Previously maybe a general approved by the administration would order it; now a colonel might suffice. The system has become more flexible (or loose) about it.
Redistribution of money around Putin is constant. We observe this in prosecutor actions. Under current conditions, sometimes that comes with killing. So part is politics, part business.
Albats: Some opposition media analysis shows that many who died strangely are connected to oil and gas, finance, defense industry, logistics, or government. Am I correct to understand that mostly this is the result of a redistribution of property among the upper nomenklatura—and Russia is, in part, returning to the 1990s among the elite?
Putin rules by applying one rule to one person, and a completely different one to another. This floating boundary, which he constantly resets, is the source of his power.
Gallyamov: Yes, exactly. Enormous financial and material flows are being redistributed. Just recently in Dagestan: the regional head was arrested, and immediately it turned out his energy assets in the billions had already been routed to the security services, who were handling his case. Or: Shoigu underperformed, and all his nearest associates are being sent to jail, while big corruption streams remain ownerless.
It’s unlikely they still flow into the budget…
Who submits without resistance has a chance to survive. Others face criminal cases; some fled; some hid. Many businesses are seized. Miller still sits at the head of Gazprom—but his people are under threat. There is no uniform rule. Putin rules by applying one rule to one and another rule to another. That floating boundary, which he constantly resets depending on his mood, is the source of his power.
Albats: If Putin knows anything about Stalin, he knows Stalin acted the same way. Is he not afraid that his entourage might not save him when needed?
Gallyamov: That’s why I said he moves in this direction unwillingly. Without enthusiasm. When it was possible to rule while remaining popular, winning elections without mass violence, he did so happily. Security forces were a secondary resource. Administrative power was secondary compared to political instruments—what Surkov, Volodin, propaganda did. But in recent years that balance has shifted.
Now propaganda is no more than smoke, masking violence. I think Putin overall understands this is a dead-end path. It leads to full estrangement of both the population and the elite. They dream of how to change everything. So death of Stalin is followed by destalinization; Mao’s death by demaoization. The leader’s course is revised. But because Putin has no other options, he is forced to act in this direction.
Kill the Rival
Albats: The Dossier Center issued an investigation alleging Putin planned to kill Alexei Navalny already in 2017. The same KGB group later followed and poisoned him in 2020. Clearly, Putin anticipated war and understood he needed to eliminate all “street” politicians to suppress protest in the bud. But why finish Navalny off deep in the Arctic colony?
Gallyamov: I think there are two factors. On foreign policy, things appeared to stabilize: the Ukrainian counteroffensive sputtered; the U.S. Congress blocked aid to Ukraine for six months; Putin began to imagine things were improving. Meanwhile, domestically, many problems: he assumed the public was ungrateful. He thinks: I’m trying, I’m nearly winning—but there’s Duntova running, there’s Boris Nadezhdin collecting signatures. Suddenly anti-war sentiment emerges.
What about election day? Obviously they will falsify. Still, you need a convincing victory—not a labored one after which it’s uncertain what will happen. And that contrast between the externally blossoming foreign policy and ungrateful internal politics led him to tighten screws. Then Navalny reemerged and declared support for Noon vs Putin. With Nadezhdin, hundreds of thousands stood in the cold to submit signatures. What happens if Navalny shouts from prison? So they first moved him far away to disrupt communication, then decided on the extreme method.
Thus simultaneously vengeance and confidence in his strength—and anxiety about upcoming elections, fear of betrayal. Something like that, I think that’s why it happened.
Notes:
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Yevgenia Albats, Abbas Gallyamov, Alexei Venediktov, Oleg Itskhoki, Sergey Guriev, Sergey Aleksashenko, Vladislav Inozemtsev, Ekaterina Duntova, Dossier Center, Sergey Markov, Roman Alekhin are designated as “foreign agents” in Russia.
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Alexei Navalny is included in the registry of “terrorists and extremists.”