Yevgenia Albats*: Mikhail Borisovich, lately the news coming primarily from the United States, especially regarding Ukraine, and of course, the news from Europe, on one hand, causes dismay, on the other — hope. Analysts say that we are witnessing tectonic shifts, the world order established after World War II is breaking down, that the United States, which supported democratic regimes for 80 years, suddenly changed its foreign policy, quarrels with its closest neighbors, declares it is ready to seize Greenland, annex Canada as the 51st state, and capture Panama. And at the same time, they express all sorts of good wishes towards Putin and talk about how he is right to bomb Ukraine. Simultaneously, the United States has stopped supplying weapons to Ukraine, with planes carrying weapons being stopped right over the Atlantic and turned back. The United States has stopped sharing intelligence with Ukraine, which greatly affects Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian “Iskanders,” “Kalibers,” “Oreshnikovs,” etc. But Europe suddenly finally woke up and said, we have to defend ourselves. How do you assess the current situation?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: I am a positivist. And I am a positivist in two directions. Firstly, I believe that Europe should have been given a kick long ago, and finally, it got that kick, and it seems to be starting to take off, albeit heavily flapping its wings. Secondly, I am a positivist regarding Trump. But here, as they say, through negativity. If we imagine that Trump really wants Putin to win, to completely surrender Ukraine, if he wants various fascist, authoritarian, and other regimes to come to power in the world, then we simply cannot do anything about it. Because no Europe is capable today of replacing the United States in terms of arms supplies, intelligence sharing, sanctions, finally. And it would be impossible to influence Trump in this regard because if there are a huge number of checks and balances concerning the domestic American agenda, then in terms of foreign policy — as long as American society as a whole is not very interested in this, and as we know, it is not very interested, — the US president has full power.
Therefore, I simply refuse to consider this version. Not because it is incredible, maybe it is likely, but if we are told tomorrow that an asteroid will meet the Earth in three days, why discuss this asteroid? Therefore, I consider a more positive scenario, and it should be noted that I consider it more likely: that Trump is basically who he claims to be, an extreme Republican with his own notions of what is right, who has quite conservative views and who wants good for America and for his rating among his voters. If we proceed from this concept, we can understand how to influence Trump, how to prepare for his actions, what can be done to prevent these actions from leading to a catastrophe for us. Then we have some active position.
Appeal to Americans
Yevgenia Albats: What do you think can be done in a situation where Trump tells the President of Ukraine that he has no cards in his hands? When he hears that Putin bombed 11 cities again, he says that in fact, anyone in Putin's place would have done the same. And it is obvious that for him, Putin is more understandable and closer (or seems so) than Volodymyr Zelensky. What can you do, knowing that Ukraine without weapons, without electronic warfare means, and without intelligence cannot survive?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: If we proceed from the position that Trump still really wants good for America and does not want to look weak, then we have a very clear set of actions. At the same time, we understand that President Zelensky evokes strong emotional rejection in him. This means that Ukraine and all of us must demonstrate to Trump and his voters that helping Ukraine is important and useful. A — important, B — useful. And from this point of view, the mineral resources agreement proposed by Trump's team is absolutely correct, which is why at the Munich conference there was a unanimous opinion from various people, from Eastern Europeans sympathetic to Ukraine to Democrats who absolutely hate Trump, that this document should be signed immediately. Sign it and tell how wonderful and useful it is for Americans. Especially for those average Americans who vote for Trump. They need to be told how great it is for America, and we need to say that we (Ukrainians) are suffering terribly, and only America can save us because these Americans who vote for Trump are very sympathetic people.
In fact, we understand that only the courage of the defenders can save us. But we have to tell Americans what they are ready to hear: only you can save us, help. And we need to say what Zelensky once said: I am ready to leave my post if it saves Ukraine. I am not saying — you need to leave, you don't need to leave, in what form, but it should be loudly announced because for Americans it is important to understand that they are saving not Zelensky, who some like and some no longer like because Trump doesn't like him, but because they are saving people who have nowhere to go, whom no one accepts, and so on.
And finally, probably the last thing I would do in this situation, I would talk about the fact that the issue is not about land, but about people. That the issue is not about capturing another 100 square kilometers of territory, but that if the army breaks, then there will be an evacuation worse than Biden's in Afghanistan. And there will be captured American weapons, there will be people hanging on the landing gear of planes, and all this will be live. And do you really want to see this at the beginning of your presidency? I think this is a serious argument, especially since it is somewhat true. So there are arguments, you just need to rethink in your head who we are addressing.
How much does a “roof” cost?
Yevgenia Albats: In several countries around the world, surveys have been conducted, particularly in the UK, France, Germany, Poland, and the United States, regarding attitudes towards Ukraine. Ukraine is sympathized with in the UK by 74% of respondents, in France by 61%. In Germany by 54%, the least, in Poland by 71%, in the United States by 62%. Question: who is responsible for the war? Putin is responsible for the war — UK 73%, Germany 64%, France 62%, Poland 82%, United States 59%. Dictator Putin, not Zelensky, agree — UK 84%, Germany 81%, France 80%, Poland 92%, United States 81%.
I bring this up to show that in fact, most Americans rather disagree with Trump's position. That is, if we talk about the average American, he rather supports Ukraine. You talk about the rare earth elements agreement, but we both understand perfectly that this is a framework agreement, that to get 500 billion from Ukraine's bowels, Americans need to invest one trillion, according to economists. Finally, in the first version of the agreement, which Zelensky refused to sign, there was a requirement that Americans would control ports, oil, and gas, and this was removed from the second version of the agreement. That is, Zelensky behaved like a person who defends Ukraine's interests. Finally, thirdly. No matter how Trump feels about Zelensky, after the incident in the Oval Office, Zelensky is supported by more than 80% of respondents.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: Everything you just said proves nothing. Because the main question that was not asked to Americans: what number in your list of priorities is the war in Ukraine? Fifteenth? Okay, then Trump, by speaking out twice against any unreasonable federal budget expenditures, overshadowed everything you think about Ukraine.
All these surveys, besides the fact that yes, there is some premise to bring the problem of the Ukrainian war to more advanced topics for Americans. And how to do it? I repeat — link it with money, show the humanitarian component, not the Zelensky component.
Now regarding the framework agreement. My recommendation is to sign without hesitation. There are no problems there with ports, oil, or gas.
Yevgenia Albats: Agreed, that is very important, it shows the whole world that Americans are ready to rebuild. It's a kind of Marshall Plan.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: Absolutely. There are no problems with that. I calculated how much Americans would ask for their “roof” as a percentage of GDP (it is clear that this is a story about a “roof,” because if it's not a “roof,” then this agreement doesn't exist: if Ukraine doesn't exist as a state, if all these resources, all these ports, and so on have passed to Putin, then it all loses any meaning). How much does America take for a “roof”? 2% of GDP, I calculated. This is approximately a third, well, at most half of the defense spending that Ukraine will have to bear due to having such an aggressive, crazy neighbor nearby. From 4% to 6% it will have to spend on defense. Two are taken by Americans for a “roof.” In my opinion, it's negotiable.
The agreement is a hook, and a very strong one, and Trump himself gives it to you. We see that in fact, he wants to play this game
Why “roof”? It's not written there that we are a “roof.” Listen, it was written in the Budapest Memorandum. Didn't the Budapest Memorandum teach you that what is written doesn't matter? Interests matter. Does this protocol of intentions ensure interests? Yes, of course, it does, because if Mr. Trump comes out and shows why he needs it, shows his voter: here, 500 trillion quintillions, I don't know what, tugriks, which I brought to the American people, then tomorrow saying that these 500 trillion quintillions were taken by Putin will be very uncomfortable. That is, we understand that from the point of view of political interest for the duration of Trump's political life — this is an argument. In 18 months, they won't forget anything, and in 36 probably won't forget either, and then it won't be Trump. So why are you refusing? This is a hook, and a very strong one, and Trump himself gives it to you. We see that in fact, he wants to play this game. So why don't you take this hook that he gives you?
Yevgenia Albats: So you think that President Zelensky's argument that they need security guarantees along with this agreement doesn't make sense?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: I would say this: it is irrelevant given the existing experience. We see how agreements turn into ordinary papers in the absence of interest. I'm not just talking about the Budapest Memorandum, but also about the 5th article, for example, of the NATO treaty. Where do we see that it was, the fifth article, which everyone happily talked about? Lawyers can find 100 thousand loopholes in any agreement to not fulfill it. All agreements play a role as long as there is a balance of interests. This agreement, this protocol of intentions is a political action that creates some motivation. It is interesting. It has other risks, not those we are talking about today. But the risks, in my opinion, are quite manageable. Therefore, alas, this will have to be resolved, and Zelensky will have to declare, alas, many different unpleasant things, as he is already doing.
Yevgenia Albats: Do you want to say that Zelensky needs to resign?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: No, I don't want to say that. If I wanted to, I would say it, despite the fact that I would immediately be attacked. But I didn't say it because I don't understand the situation in Ukraine well enough. And I don't understand how Zelensky's departure or non-departure will affect the political situation there. But to say what he once already said, and to say it so that those Americans who listen to Trump today understand that Zelensky himself is ready to leave if necessary — these words need to be repeated. So that the American says: well, yes, we are not helping Zelensky, whom Trump doesn't like, but Ukrainians.
What Trump doesn't take into account
Yevgenia Albats: Observers, including American journalists and columnists, say that Trump consistently gives gifts to Putin. Do you understand why Trump has such, I would even say, servility towards Putin?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: It's not servility. I don't believe he is psychologically completely subordinate to Putin, I don't believe in all these agent and conspiracy stories. Because the Biden administration, I think, checked all this information as much as none of us can check. If they didn't say anything like that, although they said many different things, it means there isn't any. It's not about that. If it's servility, if he is psychologically subordinate to Putin — returning to the image, it's an asteroid, it will hit the Earth in three days. Well, what to discuss then, let's go have a drink. Let's still assume what we can play with. It's not servility, it's the approach of a person used to business negotiations. He is a mediator. On one side, a housing seller, on the other side, a housing buyer. And he sees that the housing buyer needs this housing much more than the seller. And he starts pressing the buyer to raise the price.
Not because he doesn't want to press the seller, but because he understands that he can't move the seller. And if he wants the deal, he will have to move the buyer, whom he can press, by 70%, and only move the seller, whom he can press less, by 30%. This is the perception of an entrepreneur, which is very characteristic, in my opinion, of Trump. He just goes the most feasible path. It looks unpleasant because there is an obvious aggressor and an obvious victim of aggression, and we press the victim of aggression. It looks bad. But so far, Trump's voter hasn't considered it looks bad.
We can simply move from a “hot” war state to a cold war state. And in a cold war, if you don't produce enough weapons and don't have a large enough and sufficiently motivated army, the opposite side just captures you
Yevgenia Albats: But we know, and you know better than many others, what Putin is. We understand that he cannot be trusted, that he is absolutely devoid of basic moral concepts. That he will deceive and betray everyone, including Trump, when it is important to him. Aren't you afraid that suddenly Putin gets what is called the upper hand? We understand that he won't stop.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: Probably, if I were conducting these negotiations, I would conduct them somewhat differently. But without falling into unnecessary servility before Trump and his Steven Witkoff — these are the two people who are really in the game now, — I must say that they have negotiation experience a hundred times more than I do, despite my large experience.
Steven Witkoff
What they may underestimate and do underestimate, in my opinion, is that unlike business negotiations, the words of such a value leader as the American president matter here. Unlike development, here the next deal doesn't start from scratch. Here, if the President of America says something — these are new values for the whole world, and we will live with this for some time. If today America's allies have the impression that America can be unreliable, and the Germans, for example, are now talking about F-35, and that maybe it would be good to have a red button themselves that stops unauthorized use of weapons, since this red button is in the hands of unreliable people — then maybe it is worth reconsidering our position regarding this program. Well, and so on, I take very practical things. I'm just showing that words matter in a much broader aspect than just the Ukrainian-Russian war. And this, in my opinion, they may underestimate. This needs to be talked about, this needs to be reminded. Which, in my opinion, Europeans are doing today. But there is no complete understanding of this either in American society, I mean in the part that votes for Trump, nor possibly in Trump himself and his team.
And otherwise, I would refrain from giving them recommendations in terms of negotiation strategy, simply because they have more experience. As for Putin and the fact that he will betray, I completely agree with you: the issue of a ceasefire can and should be conducted, but the issue of peace until Putin leaves, at least from political life, cannot stand. We can simply move from a “hot” war state to a cold war state. And in a cold war, if you don't produce enough weapons, if you don't have a large enough and sufficiently motivated army, the opposite side just captures you.
And we need to understand that the end of negotiations is not a period, it's an ellipsis. After that, there is a lot of work to be done by both Ukrainians and Europeans. Americans have declared that they do not want to participate in this work. In fact, there are quite a few arguments that will force Americans to participate in this work. But now they declare that they don't want it, and in any case, it is clear that leadership in this will have to be taken by Europe.
Yevgenia Albats: By the reaction of the British Prime Minister Starmer, French President Macron, the new German Chancellor Merz, do you see that Europe can finally create at least a coalition of the willing? Or will it be the same as we have observed for three years in a row?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: A very difficult question, in my opinion, conceptually unsolvable. While we don't yet see Merz, we see today that the only person in Europe who is seriously about this — is the Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. All the rest, unfortunately, do not yet understand enough what they are dealing with and how to deal with it. Macron, in my opinion, is inclined to some bravado, and Starmer is still too much of a lawyer, which sometimes hinders understanding the situation that some people are capable of acting completely outside any legal framework.
Therefore, in my opinion, there are two models. The first model is where the three or four largest economies in Europe, the UK, Germany, France, and Italy agree among themselves, and the rest line up in a wake column. Or the second option — if they fail, then Europe will split into three unions of varying degrees of threat. The first degree of threat is the Northern Union, eight countries that are now talking among themselves: Sweden, Norway, the three Baltic countries, Finland, Iceland, Denmark. Poland and possibly the UK inevitably gravitate towards them. The second group of countries is Central Europe. I mean Germany, France, Italy. Those who don't like what Putin is doing terribly, but who don't feel an immediate threat. And, apparently, as a result, they will be ready for less financial expenditure on defense.
And finally, the third part is the part of Europe that historically looks favorably on Russia and is less inclined to spend money, and they don't have that money. I mean Cyprus, Greece, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia.
These three groups will have to negotiate among themselves. This will be a much worse option, but also possible. Now it is being decided in what format the situation will develop further.
Yevgenia Albats: Do you think the European Union is an unstable structure?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: In its current form, it is an unstable structure, and they will have to make some decisions that will transform the EU from a purely trade union into a military-political union to a greater extent than it is today because NATO is visibly turning from a military-political organization into a political organization. That is, the political organization will remain, NATO has a sufficient number of very important functions that cannot be removed, including, for example, pan-European standardization of armaments. A very important story that needs to be dealt with regardless of anything, and all countries will be interested in this, even such as Hungary and Slovakia, because either you produce in NATO standard, or you supply your weapons anywhere, but in Europe, there is no place for you. Therefore, I think that we will now observe either a serious compensatory story, where NATO becomes less of a military alliance, and the European Union becomes more of such an alliance, or some other options are created that will allow solving problems with such an aggressive neighbor under such an aggressive leader.
Yevgenia Albats: Putin, through Lavrov, has already stated that there should be no peacekeepers, they will not agree to any peacekeepers, and in general, everything that Europeans propose does not suit them at all. Meanwhile, if this is a ceasefire, then on the demarcation line, probably, some peacekeepers will be needed? France and the UK are really ready to send their soldiers to Ukraine?
What are real peacekeepers in modern warfare? First, aviation. Second, heavy weapons on the line of confrontation. Third — supply base. That is, essentially, it is NATO on the border with Russia
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: I am extremely critical of this. There are two types of peacekeeping missions. The first is essentially a police mission. When you send people armed with light weapons, without appropriate supply bases, etc., it is clear that these people in a confrontation situation between such powerful armies as the Russian and Ukrainian today can only play the role of hostages. Hostages and witnesses. If they even remain alive. The Americans immediately said that the fifth article will not work in this case. That is, an attack on these peacekeepers will not be a casus belli for the start of a war with NATO.
The second type of peacekeeping mission is real peacekeepers. What are real peacekeepers in modern warfare? First, aviation. Second, heavy weapons on the line of confrontation. Third — supply base. That is, essentially, it is NATO on the border with Russia. Is Putin ready to agree for NATO to move to the border with Russia? And not figurative NATO, but ready for war. I think not. But if the West is ready for the second type of peacekeeping operation, then even the first element, aviation support, would be enough for Ukraine to turn the game in its favor in the event of a new aggression. Even just aviation support, because real aviation capabilities are absolutely incomparable, Russian ones are really suppressed in a very short time, and the ability to produce such a number of aircraft in Russia simply does not exist today.
Yevgenia Albats: Why can't these capabilities be used now?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: This is what the conversation was about from the very first days of the war — a no-fly zone over Ukraine. And I was pleased that now a very influential group of European politicians and generals, real, serious people, have put forward the idea of a closed sky as feasible at least over part of Ukraine, over what we call the potential southern corridor to Moldova and central Ukraine. This is absolutely serious. And if this becomes part of the peacekeeping operation, and here you don't need to push forward any infrastructure elements, here you need what is said in this document prepared by a group of European politicians and military: in case of Putin's violation of the ceasefire conditions, European countries ensure a no-fly zone. This would be a very serious argument.
Yevgenia Albats: Why can't this be done now?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: Because it's scary. Because it is clear that relocating these planes to Ukrainian airfields is, in general, burning money in bundles. A completely different air defense system needs to be provided, and this is already a task in itself not simple. As we understand, now they have thinned out the air defense over Kyiv because of these American stories. And this means that planes must take off and prepare, in any case, at the airfields of European countries, that is, they are a potential target.
Yevgenia Albats: Jack Sullivan, former national security advisor to President Biden, responding to reproaches that the Biden administration gave too little and too late weapons, said that F-35 they could not give because Ukrainians had no ability to operate them.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: Since the time of the Soviet-American confrontation in Korea, and then in Vietnam, everyone knows that regular pilots must sit at the controls of aircraft. Everyone understood this perfectly. Either you make a decision to immediately stop this conflict, and it could have been stopped until late autumn 2022, or you have what you have. This was absolutely predictable.
In June at the forum in Vilnius, it was a common opinion: if you are serious, then aviation support. If there is no aviation support, then you are not serious. It turned out not to be serious, and we came to what we came to. So now, when we talk about peacekeeping forces, we are again talking about aviation support, peacekeeping forces without aviation support are not needed by anyone.
No golden bullet
Yevgenia Albats: Mikhail Borisovich, there are two points of view. One — Putin needs a truce because he has problems with money, weapons, and people. The second — that Putin can wage a war of attrition indefinitely. What do you think?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: I believe he can wage a war of attrition under today's conditions for another year and a half to two years. Nothing critical will happen to him until then. But starting from the end of this spring, if he decides to wage war, he will have to make several absolutely uncomfortable decisions for him. In particular, to conduct mobilization. Can he politically afford mobilization? Yes, he can. He will disguise it. Several decisions have already been prepared for this, including one pushed through the State Duma, it will be some kind of permanent draft. And he will have to switch the economy to a war footing, i.e., reorient part of the factories with mobilization plans. The population will not be able not to feel this because it is a strong blow to the real goods that people will not be able to buy. This is uncomfortable for Putin, and he doesn't really want to do it.
To say that there is a golden bullet that, hitting Putin, will make him immediately spread his arms and fall breathless — there is no such golden bullet. Is there a set of problems that make it extremely uncomfortable for Putin to continue the war? Yes, there are such problems, they are obvious, and Trump understands perfectly well how they can be very seriously strengthened. Is this enough to convince Putin to cease fire? Yes, under certain conditions. Under what conditions? And here we return to the fact that I would conduct negotiations somewhat differently than Trump's team.
Yevgenia Albats: Is a collapse in oil prices critical for Putin?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: This is one of the arguments that lie on Trump's table and that he can use. I wouldn't say he can collapse oil, but he can press it down hard. It's not fatal, but it's unpleasant.
Yevgenia Albats: And what is the critical price for Putin?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: It's unpleasant for him below 70. Further even more unpleasant. But there is no price at which he would die.
Yevgenia Albats: We remember that the price at which the Soviet Union died was 9 dollars per barrel.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: Yes, but, firstly, it wasn't about that, secondly, the Soviet Union didn't die because of that, it died because it needed to import grain, and for grain, money was needed. Russia doesn't need to import grain.
Breakdown of the world order
Yevgenia Albats: Analysts now say that the world order established after World War II is breaking down before our eyes, and these are tectonic shifts, we are in a situation of absolute unpredictability. Does this mean that we will now be in a state of turbulence when three countries — the United States of America, China, and Russia, and possibly the EU will establish new rules of the game?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: Yes, without a doubt, that's what's happening now. There are fundamental, in my opinion, economic prerequisites for this. It can be predicted that in a situation where the share of the Western bloc in world GDP was 70%, and it went down to 40%, and we see when it will drop to 30%, — it is difficult to maintain the world order in the previous mode. In my opinion, what Trump will do — he will make changes inevitable. He won't implement them, he won't have enough time for that, but he will make them inevitable, he will destabilize the system so much, meaning both the system of internal institutions and the system of international institutions, that those who come after him will be free to restore it, but it will be strange because objectively it needs to be rebuilt. And since everything will already be destroyed, they will have the opportunity and inevitability to start building a new system. We will see this, and in this new system, in my opinion, alliances will still play a huge role for America. The role of Europe, in my opinion, is underestimated by Trump's team. It is very important for America. Other Western countries, we conditionally call them Western — Australia, New Zealand, Japan belong to this bloc, — are very important, values are actually very important, but this is a conversation with the next team because this team came to destroy what is actually already outdated.
Yevgenia Albats: China has stated that it proposed to the European Union to conclude some agreements. Clearly, the Chinese see that China and the European Union have come under Trump's blow. Do you think some deal between the European Union and China is possible?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: This is the first thing that was heard in Munich in private conversations. I don't know how much this was calculated by Trump's team, but this is the first thing that was heard from European politicians. Honestly, I didn't think they would mature to this so quickly, I thought it would take a couple of months. No, it was heard right after Vance's speech that Europe will probably have to negotiate with China. Yes, this is a risk of redrawing the post-Potsdam world, which we are facing. This is a world in which China's role will be much higher.
Yevgenia Albats: Does this mean that democracy as a goal, as the regime that still allows, as Nobel laureate Amartya Sen said, people to survive, will become a rudiment, and authoritarian and totalitarian regimes will once again occupy a special place in the world?
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: No, I believe that democracy has a very important advantage. Democracy is a much more stable thing than an authoritarian regime. If we compare, then an authoritarian regime is a crisis manager. And democracy is a regular manager, it works very well when trains arrive on schedule, and it ensures that trains arrive on schedule. Another thing is that now all this has overlapped with some crisis of democracy because the transition to direct democracy is actually, according to Aristotle, a movement towards ochlocracy. And ochlocracy, as we remember, precedes dictatorship.
Yevgenia Albats: Well, ochlocracy, or mobocracy, is the rule of the mob, the rabble.
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: I wouldn't say the word “rabble” here, it wrongly defines people, that is, people are not like that. People are like that. I distinguish ochlocracy from democracy. Democracy is still a society structured by institutions. People structured themselves with institutions. That's why Roman legions won against barbarians. Each barbarian individually was stronger than a Roman legionary. But, as it turned out, formation is more effective than a crowd of barbarians.
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* Yevgenia Albats, Mikhail Khodorkovsky are declared “foreign agents” in Russia.