The IDF published the results of an investigation conducted at the highest level, which examines the military's miscalculations before and during the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, when 5000 terrorists from the Gaza Strip stormed into southern Israel. In addition to intelligence documents, the IDF investigated 41 separate battles that occurred during the attack.
The Israel Defense Forces created a website where the results of the investigation will be available to the public after their presentation.
As stated in the report, the IDF was caught off guard by the number of Hamas terrorists, their mobility, and the number of areas attacked. Additionally, the number of Israeli soldiers was significantly smaller than the number of terrorists, and there was chaos in the command chain due to previous errors in interpreting intelligence data.
As The Times of Israel writes, the disclosed materials highlight a colossal failure over many years before the Hamas invasion, in the final hours before it, as well as during the massacre and kidnappings carried out by the terrorist group. It was only several months after the invasion and massacre that it was acknowledged that the Gaza division, the regional unit responsible for the sector and the defense of southern Israel, was "defeated" within a few hours. Chaos and confusion catastrophically slowed the response that day.
The investigation indicated that intelligence data had been persistently misinterpreted for many years. The IDF believed that the Hamas terrorist group in Gaza did not pose a significant threat to Israel, that it was not interested in a large-scale war, that its tunnel network was significantly destroyed, and that any cross-border threat would be thwarted by the high-tech Israeli border fence.
During the investigation of "intelligence assessments," it was found that Military Intelligence had received information and plans indicating Hamas's intention to launch a large-scale attack on Israel over several years, but dismissed these plans as unrealistic and unfeasible. It mistakenly assumed that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was a pragmatist who did not seek serious escalation with Israel, and that the terrorist group considered its war with Israel in 2021 unsuccessful and focused its capabilities on rocket attacks rather than ground invasion.
Meanwhile, in April 2022, Hamas decided on the attack, by September 2022, the terrorist group's readiness was 85%. And in May 2023, the date was set.
The investigation indicated that the IDF identified five signs of unusual Hamas activity on the night before the terrorist group's advance on October 7, but considered that they did not indicate a planned attack. Intelligence assessments on the night of October 6 to 7 were based on the results of many years of false assessments of Hamas.
Additionally, the investigation states that not realizing in real time that the Gaza division had fallen, the General Staff did not understand the full seriousness of the attack and could not form an accurate picture of the operational situation, which became a serious problem during attempts to block the attack.
Photo: AP